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HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE REVISION OF UCC 
ARTICLE 9?: 
REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS 
STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
In our 1993 article, The Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong 
Signals and Hard Choices ("Hard Choices"), we sought to "identify 
and explain, by way of examples, some important themes and 
patterns that emerge[ d] from the [PEB Article 9 Study Committee] 
Report. "1 As another of our goals, we sought "to offer some insight 
into the challenges that the Drafting Committee" for the revision of 
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") Article 9 would face. 2 The 
Drafting Committee recently has completed its work. In 1998, the 
UCC's sponsors officially promulgated Revised Article 9. Now the 
process of introducing Revised Article 9 in the legislatures is in full 
swing.3 In this article we assess, again by way of examples, the degree 
* The authors are. respectively, Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of 
Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Interim Dean and Professor of Law. University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. They served as Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revised 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 ("Drafting Committee"). The views expressed in this 
article are not necessarily those of the Drafting Committee or its sponsors. the American Law 
Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
("NCCUSL"). 
As used in this article. "Revised Article 9" and "the revised Article" refer to the 1999 
official text of Article 9. References to "Revised section 9-XXX" and "R. § 9-XXX'' are to 
sections of Revised Article 9. "The Former Article" refers to the 1995 official text of Article 9. 
References to "Former section 9-XXX" and "U.C.C. § 9-XXX" are to sections of the Former 
Article . 
1. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Commirtee Report: 
Strong Signals and Hard Choices. 29 IDAHO L. REV. 561, 562 (1993). The article addressed 
primarily the recommendations made in the report of the UCC Permanent Editorial Board's 
Article 9 Study Committee. for which we served as reporters. See PEB STUDY GROUP. 
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, UNJFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT (Dec. l, 1992) [hereinafter REPORT]. For background on the work of 
the Study Committee. including its organization and methodology. see id. at 1-16. The 
Committee's chair and reporters also issued an interim report. See William M. Burke et aL 
Interim Report on the Activities of the Article 9 Study Committee, 46 BUS. LAW. 1883 ( 1991 ). 
2. See Harris & Mooney. supra note L at 562. 
3. For background on the drafting process. which began in 1993 and ended in early 1999 
with the final touches on Revised Article 9 and its official comments, seeR.§ 9-101 cmt. 2. 
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of success with which the Drafting Committee met the challenges that 
Hard Choices identified. Our assessment necessarily is preliminary. 
The process of legislative enactment and the experience of 
transacting business and litigating under the revised Article 
undoubtedly will lead us to refine, and perhaps revise, our views. 
We hasten to note at the outset that although we made known 
our thoughts on particular issues during the drafting process, we were 
not voting members of the Drafting Committee. On the other hand, 
we do not seek to escape our share of the responsibility should 
positions that we advanced turn out to be unwise, and we promise to 
be appropriately contrite should those against which we argued prove 
successful. Moreover, we must acknowledge responsibility for defects 
in drafting or organization, inasmuch as we bore considerable 
responsibility for those aspects of Revised Article 9. "Style" questions 
are quite another matter indeed.4 
This article is organized generally along the lines of Hard 
Choices. Part I addresses Revised Article 9 in the context of 
bankruptcy policy, with a particular focus on the relationship between 
secured credit (and creditors) and unsecured credit (and creditors). 
Part II considers Revised Article 9's modification- generally an 
expansion- of the scope of Article 9's coverage. Part III explores 
how Revised Article 9 addresses three areas that have a substantial 
impact on secured financing but which cannot be addressed fully by 
the text of Article 9: filing systems, statutory liens on Article 9 
collateral, and federal preemption of many aspects of intellectual 
property law. Part IV assesses various approaches to codification 
reflected by Revised Article 9, including the degree of balance 
between complexity and simplicity and between the promulgation of 
finely-crafted , detailed rules designed to give a definitive answer to a 
variety of questions and the establishment of "rough" principles 
intended to provide only general guidance to parties and the courts. 
I. STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN UNSECURED 
AND SECURED CREDITORS 
In Hard Choices we observed that "[t]he appropriate relationship 
4. Unde r N C CUSL's procedures. all dra ft s are revie wed by the Committee on Style , 
whi ch "revises as to phraseology a nd style, but without alte ring th e meaning o r context. all Acts 
submitted to it by Drafting Committees and a ll Acts appro ved by the Co nfe re nce ." NATI ONA L 
CON FERENCE OF COIVEvt' RS ON UN IF. STATE LA WS. PROCEDURAL AN D DR AFTI NG M ANUA L 4 
(1 997 ). 
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between secured and unsecured creditors may present the single most 
important cluster of issues that the Drafting Committee will 
address. "5 Reflecting on the process and its results, we believe that 
our observation has proved to be accurate. The potential effect of 
Article 9 revisions on the interests of unsecured creditors, including in 
a debtor's bankruptcy, was the subject of discussion throughout the 
drafting process. The Drafting Committee received assistance on 
specific bankruptcy-related issues from a special task force on 
bankruptcy issues.6 Consistent with the underlying approach and rec-
ommendations of the Report, Revised Article 9 embraces the goal of 
facilitating the extension of secured credit. The revised Article rejects 
the assumption, prevailing in some circles, that secured credit 
somehow primarily benefits secured creditors and is necessarily 
detrimental to unsecured creditors.7 Instead, it reflects the increasing 
awareness that the principal beneficiaries of secured credit are the 
borrowers to whom credit is extended and others who have 
commercial or other relationships with those borrowers.~ Assets 
claimed by secured creditors in an insolvency proceeding are not, of 
course, available for distribution to unsecured creditors. Indeed, the 
essence of a secured transaction is the resulting priority of a security 
interest over subsequent judicial lien creditors and the debtor's 
5. Harris & Mooney. supra note l, at 569. 
6. The task force. comprised large ly of bankruptcy specia li sts. devoted particular 
attention to proposals by acade mics for restricting the e ffective ness of security inte res ts. See. 
e.g .. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried. The Uneasy Case fin 1he Prioriry of Secured Claims 
in Bankruplcy. lOS YALE LJ. 857. 913-29 (1996). Having rece ived hard ly any support among 
members of the task force and no support whatsoever from anyon e who ever attended a 
meeting of the Drafting Committee, these proposals were rejected. The proposa ls were 
advocated a lso before the Council of the ALI and at a NCCUSL Annual Meeting. where they 
met with a lmost unanimous disapprovaL 
7. For a fuller descrip tion of this view. see Steven L Harris & Charl es W. Mooney. Jr.. A 
Property-Based Theory of Security Interesrs: Taking D ebtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L REV. 
2021.2045-47 (1994). 
8. See, e.g .. Heywood W. Fleisig e t a l.. Legal Restrictions on Security lnteresr.~ Limi1 Access 
ro Credit in Bolivia. 31 IN'(L LAW. 65. 66, 70-72. 98 (1997): H eywood W. Fle isig & Nuria de Ia 
Pefia , Peru: How Problems in 1he Framework for Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit. 
NAFTA: LAW & Bus. REV. AM., Spring 1997. at 33. 34-46: Steven L Harris & Charles W. 
Mooney. Jr.. Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Idenrif:ving the Victims of 
Subordinating Securiry !111eres1s in Bankruprcy . 82 CORNELL L R EV. 1349. 1356-61 (1997) : 
H arri s & Mooney. supra note 7. at 2028-37; Anthony Saunders e t a l.. Th e Economic 
Implications of !n ternarional Secured Transactions Lmv Reform: A Case Swdv. 20 U. PA. J. 
INT'L ECON. L. 309 (1999): Steven L Schwarcz. Th e Easy Case for 1he Prioritv of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy. 47 DUKE LJ. 425 (1997 ). We use the te rm "borrowers" to include se llers 
of rights to payment in transac tions governed by Article 9. sec U.C. C. § 9-102(l)(b) (Former 
Article 9 app li es to sales of accounts and cha ttel paper): R. § 9-109(a)(3) (Revised Article 9 
applies to sa les of accounts. chatte l paper. payment intangibles. and promissory notes). and 
'·secured parties" or "sec ured cred itors'' to include buyers of these rece iva bles. see U.C.C. 
§ 9-105(1)(m) (defin ing "secured party"): R. s 9-102(a)(72) (same) . 
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trustee in bankruptcy. 9 But that says nothing about the benefits that 
are conferred on borrowers and unsecured creditors generally by 
facilitating secured credit. 10 
The following discussion does not dwell on these more general 
benefits of secured credit. Instead, the discussion addresses primarily 
the extent to which Revised Article 9's enhanced facilitation of 
secured credit may be expected to provide materially greater 
recoveries for secured creditors in bankruptcy. Will these 
distributional effects of Revised Article 9 (i.e., enhanced recoveries 
for secured creditors) result in a substantial shift in the balance in 
favor of secured creditors? In general, our answer is an emphatic 
"no." Indeed, in many cases Revised Article 9 stops short of the rec-
ommendations made in the Report,11 and in several respects it places 
burdens on secured creditors that are greater than those under 
Article 9.12 
As we mentioned, Revised Article 9 generally facilitates the 
extension of secured credit, including transactions in which rights to 
payment (receivables) are sold outright. Many of its provisions make 
it easier and less expensive to create and perfect security interests and 
to achieve priority over competing claimants. Some specific examples 
may be useful. 
Following a recommendation made in the Report, tJ Revised 
Article 9 provides that a security interest in instruments, both 
9. As we observed in Hard Choices: 
Making perfection easier and less costly to accomplish is likely to tilt the balance 
between secured and unsecured creditors: the number of unperfected security interests 
in bankruptcy can be expected to decline and the allocation of a debtor 's property is 
likely to become more favorable to secured parties. 
Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 565. 
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
11. Compare, e.g., Recommendation 7.C., REPORT, supra note 1, at 68-70 (recommending 
that the Drafting Committee give serious attention to the subcommittee report's recommenda-
tions, including perfection of security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral by filing) 
with R. § 9-312(b)(1) (security interest in a deposit account as original collateral may be 
perfected only by control). 
12. Compare, e.g., R. § 9-313(c) (perfection by possession when collateral is in the 
possession of a person other than the debtor requires an acknowledgment by the other person 
that it holds the collateral for the secured party's benefit); and id. § 9-611(c) (secured party is 
required to give notification of disposition of collateral to secured parties or lienholders that 
have filed financing statements against the debtor covering the collateral) wirh U.C.C. § 9-305 
(perfection by possession when collateral is in the possession of a bailee requires notification to, · .. ,1 
but not acknowledgment by, the bailee); and id. § 9-504(3) (secured party is required to give 
notification of disposition of collateral to a competing secured party only if the secured party 
has received written notification of the competing secured party's claim). 
13. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 152-54. We discuss this recommendation in Hard Choices. 
See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 565-66. 
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negotiable and nonnegotiable, may be perfected either by filing or by 
taking possession. 14 Under the Former Article, only possession of an 
instrument would suffice for perfection. 15 Perfection by filing against 
instruments will provide substantial cost savings in many transactional 
settings. 16 
The revised Article also clarifies what constitutes an adequate 
description of collateral in a security agreement, which is a necessary 
condition for attachment of most nonpossessory security interestsY 
Similarly, it clarifies the requirements of an adequate identification of 
collateral in a financing statement. A financing statement that 
describes the collateral or indicates that it covers all assets or all 
personal property is sufficien t. 18 
Revised Article 9 also facilitates secured credit by expanding its 
reach beyond that of the Former Article. This observation assumes, 
reasonably, that extending credit or buying receivables under Revised 
Article 9's coherent and rational system offers advantages over 
operating under common-law or other statutory rules that may be 
hard to find and, once found, unclear. Revised Article 9's coverage of 
security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral, 
commercial tort claims, and sales of many rights to payment not 
covered by Article 9 illustrates this expanded scope. 14 
Revised Article 9's treatment of proceeds of collateral provides 
another example of its facilitation of secured credit. The definition of 
"proceeds'' has been expanded to cover property acquired by a 
debtor that is a functional substitute for original collateral; Former 
Article 9 covered only receipts from dispositions and collections and 
14. See R. §§ 9-312(a). 9-313(a). 
15. See U.CC § 9-304(1) . Bw see id. §§ 9-304(4)-(5). 9-306(3) (providing for te mporary 
perfection of a security interest in instruments in specified circumstances ). CJ R. ~§ 9-312( e). 
(g) . 9-315(d) (preserving these rul es in revised form). 
16. As explained in Hard Choices, a perfection-by-filing rule makes it unnecessary to 
determine whe ther a particular writing is an instrument or to make a ltern a ti ve assumptions. 
necess itat ing both filing and taking possession. See Harris & Mooney. supra note 1. at 565-66. 
Perfection by filing against instruments also avoids the costs and impracticalities of taking 
possession when the co ll ateral consists of large numbers of instruments. See id. at 566: R ~ 9-312 
cmt. 2. 
17. See R. §§ 9-108. 9-203(b)(3)(A). 
18. See id. § 9-504. 
19. Revised Article 9 covers sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes . See id. 
§ 9-109(a)(3) : see ulso id. § 9-102(a)(61) (defining "payment intangi ble"). (65) (defining 
"promissory note"). As did Former Article 9. Revised Art icle 9 applies to sales of accoun ts and 
chattel paper. See R. § 9-l09(a)(3): U .CC § 9-102(1)(b). The definition of "accoun t'' also has 
been expanded to include most ri ghts to paymen t that wo uld be gene ral intangibles unde r 
Article 9. sa les of which were not cove red by that art icl e . See U.CC § 9- 102(a) . The expanded 
scope of Revised Artic le 9 is addressed in more detail below in Part II. 
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certain insurance proceeds. 20 The revised Article also provides that if 
a security interest in original collateral is perfected by any means, a 
security interest in identifiable cash proceeds of the collateral is 
perfected indefinitely.21 Under Former Article 9, a security interest in 
cash proceeds continued to be perfected beyond ten days only if the 
security interest in the original collateral had been perfected by 
filing. 22 In addition, Revised Article 9 contains special priority rules 
that preserve for proceeds the priority in original collateral afforded 
by various nontemporal priority rules (some new, some derived from 
the Former Article ). 23 
Revised Article 9 reflects substantial improvements in two other 
important respects- filing and enforcement.24 As was the case under 
the Former Article, the filing system is the heart of Revised Article 9. 
The new filing rules, found in Part 5 of the revised Article, clarify 
various questions left unanswered by Former Article 9, resolve issues 
left in doubt or in conflict under the Former Article by the courts, and 
impose specific requirements on filing offices to increase efficiency, 
accuracy, and speed. The new filing system also is a "medium-
neutral" regime that permits filing offices to adopt nonpaper, 
electronic means of filing and searching. Similarly, the enforcement 
provisions found in Part 6 of the revised Article draw on 
experience-good, bad, and indifferent-under Former Article 9 in 
fashioning solutions to various problems that arose under the Former 
Article. New Part 6 also adds needed flexibility. Although the revised 
enforcement provisions may be expected to be used in only a small 
minority of transactions,25 we anticipate that the increased comfort 
provided ex ante, as in the other examples mentioned above, will help 
make more credit available at a lower cost. Revised Article 9's 
approach to contractual and legal restrictions or prohibitions of 
20. Compare R. § 9-102(a)(64) with U.C.C. § 9-306(1). 
21. SeeR.§ 9-315(c). (d)(2). 
22. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b). 
23. SeeR.§ 9-322(c) -(e). We discuss these rules below in Part IV.A.2. 
24. For an overview and discussion of the highlights of filing and enforcement under 
Revised Article 9. see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney. Jr.. Filing and Enforcement 
Under Revised Article 9. 54 Bus. LAW. 1965 (1999). For more detailed discussions. see Harry C. 
Sigman. Twenty Questions A hour Filing Under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game Under 
New Purr 5. 74 CI-11.-KENT L. REV. 861 (1999); and Donald J. Rapson. Defiwlt and Enforcement 
of Security Interests Under Revised Article 9. 74 CH!.-KENT L. REV. 893 ( 1999). We discuss the 
relationship between the statutory text of Revised Article 9 and the extra-textual characteristics 
of filing systems below in Part III. 
25. See Ronald J. Mann. Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Deht. 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 159. 227 (1997) ("[N]ot a single one of my forty-four personal-property [commercial loan] 
profiles involved a repossession and sale of collateral."). 
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assignments of intangibles provides a final example of its facilitation 
of secured credit. The revised Article overrides virtually all 
contractual and legal restrictions to the creation, attachment, and 
perfection of security interests in intangibles;26 however, it recognizes 
and protects the interests of other parties to intangibles by insuring 
that these interests cannot be compromised by the enforcement of a 
security interestY Although these new overrides may be expected to 
allow increased recoveries from collateral in bankruptcy, we expect 
the effects outside of bankruptcy-the facilitation of additional 
extensions of credit-will be more pronounced.28 
These examples and many other provisions of Revised Article 9 
reflect the Drafting Committee's effort to achieve more than merely 
"better," more "efficient," "equitable," or "reasonable" rules to 
govern secured transactions. An overarching goal of the revisions was 
to provide in the transactional context enhanced certainty and 
predictability from the inception of transactions. This certainty can 
facilitate transactions even though an understandable rule with 
predictable consequences may be normatively suboptimal. 
One might conclude from the foregoing that the Drafting 
Committee pulled no punches in making security interests as easy to 
conclude, perfect, and enforce, and as impervious to the claims of 
third parties, as humanly possible. But that conclusion would be far 
off the mark. To the contrary, the Drafting Committee sought 
26. See R. §§ 9-406 to 9-408. 
27. Consider, for example, a license of intellectual property that prohibits the licensee from 
assigning the right to use the intellectual property. Revised section 9-408(a) renders this 
restriction ineffective to the extent it impairs the crea tion, attachment, or perfection of a 
security interest in the licensee's rights (a general intangible). Thus, the licensee may crea te an 
enforceable, perfected security interest in its rights under the license. However, Revised section 
9-408(d) provides that, if the restriction on assignment would be effective under other law, the 
security interest is not enfo rceable against, and imposes no duty on, the account debtor (here. 
the licensor) . A similar result would obtain if the restriction on assignment arose under other 
law. Of course, Rev ised Article 9 does not override conflicting federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. 
VI (S upremacy Clause). 
28. As the Official Comments explain: 
The principal effects of this section [R. § 9-408] will take place outside of bankruptcy. 
Compared to the relat ive ly few deb tors that en ter bankruptcy, there are many more 
tha t do not. By making available previously unavailable property as collate raL this 
sect ion should enable deb tors to obtain additional credit. For purposes of de termining 
whe ther to extend credit, unde r some circumstances a secured party may ascribe va lue 
to the co llateral to wh ich its security interest has attached, even if this section 
prec ludes the secured party from enforcing the security interest without the agreement 
of the acco unt debtor or person ob ligated on the promissory note. T his may be the case 
where the secured party sees a likelihood of obtaining that agreement in the future. 
This may also be the case where the secured party anticipates that the collate ral will 
give rise to a type of proceeds as to which this section would not apply. 
R. § 9-408 cmt. 8. 
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balance at every turn. If an efficient system of secured transactions is 
a good thing, it does not follow that pushing this generally beneficial 
regime to the extreme in every context must be even better. Indeed, 
the filing system itself may properly be viewed as an impediment to 
creating a perfected security interest. Article 9 extracts from the 
parties the price of public notice in exchange for the transactional 
benefits that it provides. 
Examples abound of the revised Article's balance and the 
Drafting Committee's restraint; we mention only a few here. First, 
although the thrust of Revised Article 9 is the facilitation of secured 
credit, the revision process saw little interest in making changes that 
would materially disrupt the status quo concerning the avoidance of 
unperfected security interests in bankruptcy.29 For example, a 
proposal to confer on an unperfected security interest priority over a 
judicial lien30 gathered virtually no support among members of the 
Drafting Committee or the many advisors and observers.31 
One of the most controversial aspects of the Report - at least if 
controversy is measured by the apparent level of dyspepsia that it 
generated during the drafting process-was the recommendation that 
Article 9 embrace deposit accounts as original collateraP2 From the 
outset, it was clear that a substantial minority of the Drafting 
29. One might quibble with the statemen t in the text. Revised Article 9 facilitates secured 
credit in part by enhancing certainty, including by making the requirements for perfection more 
certain. These requirements may result in fewer security interes ts that are inadvertently 
unperfected when the debtor enters bankruptcy. We do no t believe that the consequent 
reduction in the number of unperfec ted security interests avoided in bankruptcy can be 
characterized fairly as a disruption of bankruptcy avoidance powers. 
30. See James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 LOY. L.A. L. 
R EV. 823, 823-26 (1993). 
31. The abse nce of support may have reflected views on the merits, concerns about adverse 
political reactions that might jeopardize enactment, distributional bias, or some combination of 
these (or other) reasons. However, the absence of support most certainly did not result from the 
mistaken notion that adopting the proposal would, somehow, contradict principles embodied in 
the Bankruptcy Code or be outside the proper domain of Article 9. It could hardly be clearer 
that whether the bankruptcy trustee may exercise the power to avoid any given transfer under 
Bankruptcy Code section 544(a) depends exclusively on nonbankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 544(a) (1994). For personal property and fi xtures, nonbankruptcy law normally is UCC 
Article 9. 
32. Benefiting from two reports on the subject fr om an advisory group and drawing upon 
the experience of deposit account fin ancing in three states, the Study Committee recommended 
that the Drafting Committee revise Article 9 to include deposit accounts as original collateral, 
see Recommendation 7.A., R EPORT, supra note 1, at 68, and that the Drafting Committee 
seriously consider adopting the specific perfection, priority, choice-of-Jaw, enforcement, and 
other rules recommended by the advisory gro up. See Recommendation 7.C., id .. a t 68. When the 
Report was issued in December 1992, deposi t accounts could serve as original collateral under 
Article 9 as enacted in fou r states-California, H awaii , Illinois, and Louisiana. See id. at 68 n.2. 
However, Illinois had been in the group for less than a year. The group now includes Idaho as 
well. 
·! 
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Committee, including some members associated with the secured 
financing industry, had reservations about including deposit accounts 
as original collateral. The Drafting Committee disagreed over 
whether lenders actually would extend additional credit in reliance on 
a deposit account to which the debtor had access; it disagreed over 
whether obtaining a perfected security interest in all deposit accounts 
of a debtor would become the routine result in the vast run of secured 
transactions; it disagreed over the appropriate priority rule for 
resolving a conflict between a security interest in a deposit account as 
original collateral and a security interest in the deposit account 
claimed as proceeds of inventory, accounts, or other original 
collateral; it disagreed over the appropriate priority rule for resolving 
a conflict between a security interest in a deposit account and the 
bank's right of setoff; and it disagreed over whether the benefits of 
including deposit accounts as original collateral justified the many 
special provisions required to accomplish the task. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York expressed concern that security interests 
in deposit accounts would impede the free flow of funds through the 
payment system. Consumer-advocacy groups feared that individuals 
would inadvertently or unwisely encumber their bank accounts. 
Ultimately, the Drafting Committee settled on an approach that 
appears to have satisfied (grudgingly, perhaps) all concerned. The 
basic principles of the approach are straightforward.33 First, Revised 
Article 9 deals directly with the concerns of the New York Fed by 
providing that transferees of funds from a deposit account take free 
of a security interest in the deposit account, even if they actually 
know of the security interest and even if they give no value.3~ The 
only exception is for a transferee who acts in collusion with the debtor 
in violating the rights of the secured party. 35 Other than encountering 
some difficulties articulating the appropriate standard for the 
exception, the Drafting Committee had little difficulty settling on this 
rule. 
The Drafting Committee had greater difficulty deciding what to 
do about consumer deposit accounts. Representatives of banks that 
extend consumer credit argued for including them as original 
33. This approach is discussed somewhat more fully below in Part II.E. For a more 
complete and detailed discussion of the issues raised by including deposit accounts as original 
collateral under Revised Article 9, see Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract and Back: 
An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CH!.-KENT L. REV. 963 (1999). 
34. See R. § 9-332(b ). 
35. See id. 
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collateral. They claimed that the applicable common-law 
requirements for an effective "pledge" of a deposit account were 
uncertain and, to the extent certain, costly to implement. 
Representatives of consumer-advocacy groups did not dispute this 
claim. Rather, they objected to eliminating the uncertainty and cost, 
lest the use of deposit accounts as original collateral become more 
widespread. Perhaps because they made a political judgment that 
opposition to the proposed inclusion of deposit accounts in consumer 
transactions might have resulted in excluding deposit accounts as 
original collateral in commercial transactions as well, the Drafting 
Committee agreed to exclude from Revised Article 9 assignments of 
deposit accounts in consumer transactions.36 
The third basic principle is that a security interest in a deposit 
account as original collateral may be perfected only by "control"; it 
may not be perfected by filing a financing statementY "Control" of a 
deposit account is defined in much the same way as "control" of a 
security entitlemenPo A secured party having control of a deposit 
account normally has the power (even if not always the right) to 
appropriate the funds on deposit. In the minds of some, control 
served as a proxy for the secured party's having relied on the deposit 
account as collateral when deciding whether and to what extent to 
extend credit to the debtor. Perhaps more accurately, lack of control 
served as a proxy for lack of reliance. A secured party that does not 
even take the steps necessary to enable itself to reach the funds on 
the debtor's default is unlikely to rely on the deposit account as 
original collateral in any meaningful way. Its unperfected security 
interest is junior to the rights of the debtor's judicial lien creditors and 
trustee in bankruptcy. Revised Article 9's control-only perfection rule 
is in part a response to those who argued that it should not be "too 
easy" to take a deposit account as original collateral. The rule actually 
makes it more difficult to perfect a security interest in a deposit 
account as original collateral than under the nonuniform versions of 
36. See id. § 9-109(d) ( l 3) . 
37. See id. §~ 9-312(b )( l ). 9-314(a) . A sec urity interes t in a depos it acco unt that is proceeds 
of most o ther ty pes of othe r collatera l may be pe rfected by filing. See id. § 9-3 15( c). ( d )(2) . 
38. Compare id. § 9-104(a) wilh U .C.C. § 8-106(d). A secured pa rty has cont ro l of a deposit 
acco unt if the secured pa rty is th e bank with which th e deposit account is maintained: if the 
debtor. secured party, and bank with which the depos it account is mainta ined agree in an 
authenti ca ted reco rd that th e bank will comply with instructions o riginated by the secured party 
directing dispositio n of the fund s in th e account without further consent by the de btor: o r if the 
secured party becomes the bank 's customer with respect to th e account. See R. ~ 9-104( a) . 
1999] REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS 1367 
Article 9 currently in force in some jurisdictions.39 
Modification of the method of perfecting a security interest 
through the possession of collateral by a person other than the debtor 
or secured party is another example of the measured approach taken 
in Revised Article 9. Under Former Article 9, perfection by 
possession could be achieved by the bailee's receipt of notification of 
the security interest.40 In a change analogous to the control-only 
perfection rule for deposit accounts, perfection in this setting under 
Revised Article 9 occurs only if a person other than the debtor or 
secured party "authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds [or 
will hold] possession of the collateral for the secured party's 
benefit."~ 1 
No one can prove or even predict with confidence whether and 
the extent to which unsecured creditors generally will fare better or 
worse under Revised Article 9.42 Is the end result "perfect" in every 
respect? Of course not. But the Drafting Committee and, ultimately, 
the UCC's sponsors used their best efforts to modernize, improve, 
and refine the law of secured transactions with a view toward 
facilitating extensions of credit. The project was undertaken with care 
and patience. It was characterized by robust debate and the frank 
exchange of differing views. There was nothing particularly novel or 
odd about the exercise, except that the Drafting Committee received 
greater and more widespread input than in any earlier uniform law 
project that we know about.43 
39. For example. Ca lifo rnia law provides that pe rfectio n is achieved merel y by giving 
writte n no tice of the security interest to the bank at which the deposit account is mainta ined. 
See CAL. COI'vl. CODE§ 9302(l)(g)(ii) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999). 
40. See U .C. C. s 9-305. This approach left seve ral questions unanswered and disputed. 
inc luding whether the secured party. as opposed to the deb tor. could give an effective 
notification and whether a bail ee 's receipt of notification imposed upon the bailee any dutie s. 
41. R. ~ 9-313(c)(1). 
42. See Harris & Mooney. sup ra note 8. at 1356-64. 
43. Fo rtunately. very few of th e many who followed the revision process appear to have 
been swa yed by hyperbole painting it as a classic David and Go li at h battle of good agai nst ev il. 
See, e.g .. Kenneth N. Kl ee. Barbarians ell rlze Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-
Out Proposal. 82 CORNE LL L. RE V. 1466. 1468 (1997) (characte rizing th e revision process as a 
.. secured creditors· grab .. th at re fl ects " hyste rica l effort s to e ntrench wea lth in th e ha nds of 
banks. insurance companies. and finance companies a t the ex pense of tort c red ito rs. tax 
cred itors. e nvironme nta l creditors. and . perhaps. employees and trade creditors.'): see also 
E li zabeth Warren. JV!a king Policy with lmpetfecr lnfomwlion: The Arricle 9 Full Prio riry 
Deb{{{es . 82 CO RNELL L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1997) (describing reform effort as a "headlong push 
to en large on every scintill a of priority for secured creditors"). 
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II. SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9 
Including deposit accounts as original collateral is not the only 
way in which the revision enlarges the scope of Article 9. That scope 
already was very broad. The Former Article applied generally to "any 
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a 
security interest in personal property or fixtures," 44 and to "security 
interests created by contract. "45 Although Former section 9-104 
excluded thirteen types of transactions, several of the exclusions 
followed directly from the limitations inherent m the scope 
provisions.46 
Article 9 is a product of the 1950s, when personal property 
financing was concerned largely with goods and rights arising from 
transactions in goods, such as accounts (rights to payment for goods 
sold) and documents of title. Other types of intangible property have 
become important sources of wealth in the ensuing decades. Not 
surprisingly, many of the Report's recommendations to expand the 
Article's scope dealt with rights to payment (sales of general 
intangibles for money due, deposit accounts, rights under insurance 
policies, tort claims) and other intangible collateral (intellectual 
property)Y The transactions that the recommendations would bring 
within the ambit of Revised Article 9 generally are possible under the 
common law.48 However, Article 9 provides a legal framework that 
the Study Committee thought likely to reduce the costs and 
uncertainty attendant to common-law transactions. 
In this part we examine the extent to which the revised Article 
follows the Study Committee's recommendations concernmg scope 
44. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a). 
45. Id. § 9-102(2). 
46. See, e.g., id. § 9-104( c) (generally excluding liens given by statute or other rule of law 
for services and materials). (j) (generally excluding the creation or transfer of an interest in or 
lien on real estate). 
47. Despite the breadth of Article 9's coverage, Part liLA of the Report addressed seven 
scope-related topics. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-49 (sales of general intangibles and credit 
card receivables), 50-55 (intellectual property), 56-57 (rights under insurance policies), 58-59 
(tort claims). 60-66 (fixtures and real estate-related collateral), 67 (oil, gas. and minerals-related 
collateral). 68-71 (deposit accounts). Other portions of the Report dealt with several other areas 
that raised issues of Article 9's scope. See id. at 91-93 (non-UCC principles of law and equity), 
106-34 (proceeds). 178-80 (nonassignable contracts. permits, and licenses), 181-84 (agricultural 
financing), 194-98 (financing buyers and nonlease bailments). 
48. Although the common law permits the creation of a security interest in a deposit 
account. the common-law requirements may serve as a practical impediment to taking a security 
interest in a deposit account used for day-to-day operations. See, e.g., Dwight L. Greene. 
Deposit Accounts as Bank Loan Collateral Beyond Setoff to Pe1jection- The Common Law Is 
Alive and Well, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 259 (1990). 
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and explain briefly how the Drafting Committee reached the results it 
did. 
A. Sale of General Intangibles 
The Drafting Committee expended much time and energy 
considering issues related to sales of rights to payment.49 Unlike the 
decision whether to include deposit accounts as original collateral, 
which was contentious, there was general agreement from the outset 
on the goals to be accomplished with respect to sales of receivables. 
The problems were primarily ones of implementation. 
Former Article 9 applied to sales of certain types of payment 
streams-accounts and chattel paper. Sales of other rights to 
payment-general intangibles and promissory notes-continued to be 
governed by non-Article 9 law. Not very long after Article 9 became 
widely enacted, Homer Kripke observed that the exclusion of non-
sales- and non-service-related rights to payment from the definition 
of "account" was an anomaly and did not reflect the intent of the 
drafters. 5° The reason for including outright sales of payment streams 
in a law governing secured transactions applies equally to virtually all 
rights to payment, regardless of the nature of the transaction under 
which the right arisesY Accordingly, the Study Committee 
recommended that Revised Article 9 include sales of general 
intangibles for money due.52 In Hard Choices we observed that the 
Drafting Committee would face two challenges in giving effect to this 
recommendation. First , it would need to distinguish general 
intangibles for money due from other general intangibles (e.g., the 
franchisee 's rights under a franchise). Sales of the latter typically are 
not financing transactions and, therefore, not properly within the 
scope of Article 9. Second, the Drafting Committee would need to 
exclude sales of loan participations, including loan participations in 
chattel paper, from the scope of the revised Article.53 
49. Sales of rights to payment are an important component of securitization transactions. 
For a di scussion of the revised Article 's like ly effects on securitization, see Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 947 (1 999). 
SO. See Homer Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intan gibles, Proceeds, and 
Priorities , 41 N.Y. U . L. R EV. 687, 690-93 (1 966). 
51. As the Official Comme nt to Former section 9-102 explained, "Commercial fin ancing on 
the basis of accounts and chattel paper is often so conducted that the distinction be tween a 
security transfer and a sale is blurred, and a sa le of such property is therefo re covered by 
[Article 9.]" U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2. 
52. See Recommendation 1.A. , R EPORT, supra note 1, at 43. 
53. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 571-72. 
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The Drafting Committee made the first decision, to apply 
Revised Article 9 to sales of general intangibles for money due, early 
and easily. From the earliest drafts, the Drafting Committee was 
content to define these general intangibles by reference to the 
account debtor's "principal obligation."54 The Drafting Committee 
apparently recognized the futility of striving for greater precision and 
made virtually no effort over the following years to distinguish what 
have come to be known as "payment intangibles," whose sale is 
subject to Revised Article 9, from other general intangibles, whose 
sale is not governed by the revised Article. Thus, Revised Article 9 
defines "payment intangible" as "a general intangible under which 
the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation. "55 
As an Official Comment observes: 
Virtually any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment 
of money once one hypothesizes, for example, that the account 
debtor is in breach of its obligation. The term "payment 
intangible," however, embraces only those general intangibles 
"under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a 
monetary obligation. "56 
Undoubtedly, at some time, property will be sold as to which the 
nature of the account debtor's principal obligation (monetary or 
otherwise) is uncertain. In determining whether the collateral is a 
payment intangible, courts should consider the purpose for including 
sales of payment intangibles within Revised Article 9 and the 
consequences of doing soY 
Most of the Drafting Committee's time and energy on the issue 
of sales of general intangibles was spent confronting the second 
challenge, finding a way to exclude sales of loan participations from 
the scope of the Revised Article.58 The Drafting Committee's efforts 
54. The Drafting Committee decided to include within the scope of Revised Article 9 most 
sales of general intangibles for money due at its very first meeting. The first full draft to reflect 
this decision defined "general intangible for money due or to become due" to mean "a general 
intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is to pay money." U.C.C. 
§ 9-106 (NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft 1995). 
55. R. § 9-102(a)(61). This section differs from the analogous 1995 provision cited in the 
preceding note in only two, relatively insignificant ways. First. the defined te rm has been 
changed to "payment intangible" from "general intangible for money due or to become due." 
Second, the definition eliminated the use of the defined term "money." Compare id. with U.C.C. 
§ 9-106 (NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft 1995). '"Money' means a medium of exchange 
authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government." U.C.C. § 1-201(24). 
56. R. § 9-102 cmt. 5d (quoting id. § 9-102(a)(61) (emphasis added)). 
57. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (UCC "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies"), (2) (explaining underlying purposes and policies of UCC). 
58. The Study Committee appreciated that Article 9 may be construed as covering some 
sales of participations in loans that are evidenced by chattel paper. It recommended that Article 
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to meet that challenge were complicated by the conflicting goals of 
financial institutions. Bringing payment intangibles into Article 9 
proved to be popular with those departments of a financial institution 
which handle securitization and other financing transactions such as 
sales of credit card receivables. It would enable these transactions to 
proceed with greater certainty, less risk , and less cost. On the other 
hand, those who staffed loan participation desks feared that bringing 
sales of loan participations into Revised Article 9 would wreak havoc 
and adamantly opposed revising Article 9 along those lines. 
With the assistance of the American Bar Association Task Force 
on Securitized Asset Financing, the Drafting Committee considered 
and rejected several statutory approaches to this problem. Ultimately 
people realized that the concern of the loan participation markets was 
less with the abstract question of inclusion or exclusion from Revised 
Article 9 than with the practical impediments that might arise from 
conditioning perfection on the filing of a financing statement.5° The 
Drafting Committee 's elegant solution to this problem was to provide 
that sales of loan participations be perfected automatically upon 
attachment.110 To accomplish this result , the Drafting Committee still 
needed to distinguish sales of loan participations, which were 
perfected automatically, from sales of other rights to payment, which 
9 be revised to provide that " loan pa rticipations and other loan sales by financial instituti o ns 
(and. possibly, sales by o the r cl asses o f professional lende rs) do no t constitute the sa le of chatte l 
paper that is within the sco pe of A rticle 9." R ecomme nda tion 21.C. . R EPORT. supra note L a t 
169. Pe rhaps because of its inability to distinguish be tween loan participati ons and other sales of 
righ ts to payment. the Drafting Committee took no action on this recommendation. 
59. The Report suggests th a t Article 9's '' filing requireme nts would be obstruc ti ve in the 
high volume, high ve locity loan-participa tion market." !d. a t 47. There is some question. 
however , as to the extent to which a participant in th e loan-participation marke t would have 
reason to care about whether its inte rest is pe rfected. Pe rfection comes into play only as against 
competing cred itors (or a receive r) of the se ller or as against another buyer of the same 
par ticipation interest. The first re t1ects the risk tha t the ass ignor will become insolvent. 
A ssignees of loan part icipations take at least some of this risk tod ay with respect to the 
creditworthiness o f the ir assigno rs. Because Article 9 does no t apply to the sa le of loan 
participations. see U.C.C. § 9-102(1 )-(2). th e common law appli es . Even if o ne is ce rtain whi ch 
state's common law gove rns, one is rarely completely cer tain wha t the gove rning law require s be 
don e to tak e priority over a subsequent jud icial lien creditor of the assignor. For example. if 
New York law a pplies. does B enedict v. Rarner. 268 U .S. 353 (1925) . require the assignee to take 
dominion ove r the rece iva ble'> Do typical participation arrangements and p racti ces sa tisfy the 
Benedict req ui re ments? The second aspect of perfecti on implicates the risk that th e ass ignor is 
engaging in fraud. A gai n. assignees take that risk today and rely on the hones ty o f th eir 
assigno rs and the ass igno rs' ability and wi llingness to make good in the case o f inad ve rte nt 
multiple ass ign ments. T here is no title regist ry for loan participations. and th e common law 
governing priority in the case of multiple ass ignments is often unce rtain (eve n if one can 
de termine which state's common law governs) . 
60. See R. § 9-309(3). 
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require some act to perfect.61 It did so not by defining "loan 
participation" (a task that proved futile) but rather by defining as an 
"account" nearly every type of payment stream the Committee could 
think of, other than payment streams represented by chattel paper or 
instruments.62 Treating these rights to payment as accounts had the 
effect of imposing a filing requirement for both outright sales and 
assignments that secure obligations. It also had the effect of leaving in 
the residual category of "payment intangibles" the right to repayment 
of a loan.63 
But what about the integrity of the filing system and the need for 
public notice? Every potential buyer of a loan participation from a 
bank knows that the bank sells participations. The filing of a financing 
statement covering "general intangibles" or "loan" gives no 
information. Even a financing statement that describes a particular 
loan is unlikely to give sufficient information to justify the delay that 
might result if sales of participations routinely were preceded by a 
search of the files against the seller. Under the Former Article, a 
prospective buyer of a loan participation had no way to insure that it 
was buying something that had not been sold before. Participants 
took this risk and were forced to rely on the honesty of the seller 
(often the lead bank that made the loan to the borrower) to minimize 
it. Revised Article 9's automatic-perfection rule applicable to sales of 
payment intangibles does not exacerbate the situation. On the other 
hand, by expanding the category of accounts, Revised Article 9 
increases the sale transactions in which filing is required as a 
condition of perfection. In some cases, doubt may arise concerning 
whether the collateral is a payment intangible or account or, if the 
collateral is a payment intangible, whether the transaction is a sale or 
an assignment that secures an obligation. 04 The parties most likely to 
61. A security interest arising from the sale of an account. chattel paper, or an instrument 
(other than a promissory note) may be perfected by filing. See id. §§ 9-309(4). 9-310(a). 9-312(a). 
A security interest arising from the sale of tangible chattel paper or an instrument (other than a 
promissory note) may also be perfected by taking possession of the collateral. See id. 
§§ 9-309(4). 9-313(a). A security interest arising from the sale of electronic chattel paper may be 
perfected by control. See id. § 9-314(a); see also id. §§ 9-312(e) (providing for temporary 
perfection of security interests in instruments). 9-312(g) (same). 9-315(d) (providing for 
temporary perfection of security interests in proceeds). 
62. Tort claims reduced to contractual obligations constitute an exception that may have 
escaped the attention of the Drafting Committee. See id. ~ 9-109 cmt. 15. 
63. A loan evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument is not a ··payment intangible." See 
id. § 9-102(a)(42) (defining "general intangible"). A loan made under a credit card is an 
··account." See id. § 9-l02(a)(2) (defining ''account"). 
64. The U CC does not give guidance for distinguishing an outright sale of a receivable 
from an assignment for collateral purposes. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 4. 
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engage in the assignment of rights to payment are likely to be 
sophisticated and to file in doubtful cases. By doing so, for very little 
cost they can protect against the possibility that the collateral is an 
account or that the transaction is the assignment of a payment 
intangible to secure an obligation.65 
B. Sale of Promissory Notes 
The Study Committee also gave some consideration to 
expanding the scope of Article 9 to include outright sales of 
instruments.66 After questioning whether buyers of instruments 
should be exempted from Article 9's filing requirements while buyers 
of other rights to payment are not, the Report concluded: 
Notwithstanding the possible logic of imposing Article 9 filing 
requirements on non-possessory buyers of instruments, the 
Committee is reluctant to propose that change without the benefit 
of substantial additional investigation. Moreover, it seems unlikely 
that such a revision would garner widespread support. It also 
probably would necessitate considerably broader transactional 
exclusions from Article 9 (or its perfection requireillents) for sales 
of instruments.67 
The Drafting Committee gave little thought to sales of 
instruments until the very end of the revision process. At its last full-
scale meeting, in March 1998, the Drafting Committee decided to 
include sales of promissory notes , which embody promises to pay, but 
not checks and other drafts, which order a person to pay. Once the 
decision was made to include sales of promissory notes, the decision 
65. Also to protect the expectations of participants in the loan-participation market. 
contractual restrictions on assignme nt of the lende r's rights under a loan agreement were 
singled out for special trea tment. Like restrictions on the assignment of other receivables , 
res trictions on these rights are completely ineffective to prevent the creation. attachment, 
perfection. or enforcement of a security interest in the receivable which secures the lender's 
obligation to a secured party. See id. § 9-406(d) . But R evised Article 9 does not displace other 
law that gives e ffect to restrictions on the outright sale of the lender 's rights. See id. §§ 9-406(d) , 
9-408 (a)-(b ). 
66. The Report observed. '· If it decides to extend Article 9 to sa les of general intangibles, 
t!te Drafting Committee also may wish to consider a further expansion to cover sales of other 
rights to payme nt tha t ofte n are the subject of fin ancings - instruments." R EPORT. supra note 1. 
at 47. Under Former Article 9, " instrument" meant a nego tiable instrument , as defined in UCC 
sec tion 3-104. or any othe r writing tha t evidences a right to th e payment of money, is not itself a 
security agreement or lease . and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transfe rred by 
delive ry with any necessary indorsement or assignment. See U. C. C. § 9- 105(1) (i) . The definition 
in Revised Article 9 is substantiall y the same. See R. § 9-102(a)(47). 
67. REPORT. supru note l. at 48 (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnot e, the Report 
obse rves: "E ve n in the absence of a filing requirement for sa les of instrume nts. the se lle r's 
re tention of possession could , in appropriate circumstances . provide evidence leading to 
avoidance o f the buyer's inte rest as a fra udulent transfer. " !d. at 48 n.l 6. 
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to make sales perfected upon attachment6~ followed almost 
immediately. The draft then was revised to treat sales of promissory 
notes the same as sales of payment intangibles in other respects. For 
example, certain sales were excluded from the scope of Revised 
Article 9 because they are not likely to be financing transactions,69 
and legal and contractual restraints on alienation were made 
ineffective. 70 
Having taken up sales of instruments at the eleventh hour, the 
Drafting Committee did not spend much time considering the 
ramifications of its decision. Whether otherwise avoidable problems 
will arise as a consequence remains to be seen. 
C. lnsLtrance 
Former Article 9 excluded transfers of "an interest in or claim in 
or under any policy of insurance," except as proceeds of other 
collateral. 71 Consistent with the Report's recommendation, 72 early 
drafts of Revised Article 9 narrowed the exclusion substantially. 73 
Certain sectors of the insurance industry, most notably the life 
insurance industry, objected to the potential inclusion of insurance as 
original collateral. We met with representatives of the life insurance 
industry to discuss their concerns, nearly all of which related to the 
insurer's status as an obligor. In essence, the insurers wanted to be 
able to determine with certainty whom to pay to discharge their 
obligations under their policies, and they wanted to continue making 
that determination in accordance with existing procedures.7-l The 
Drafting Committee agreed with us that some of these concerns were 
unwarranted (e.g., the concern that an insurer would need to consult 
68. See R. § 9-309(4). This rule was chosen for the same reason that sales of payment 
intangibles are automatically perfected. so as not to interfere with the loan-participation market. 
69. See id. ~ 9-l09(d)(4) -(5). (7). 
70. See id. § 9-408. 
71. See U.C.C. ~ 9-l04(g). 
72. See Recommendation 3. REPORT. supra note 1. at 56 (recommending that the Drafting 
Committee give serious consideration to expanding the scope of Article 9 to include security 
interests in ""most forms of business insurance policies and at least some forms of ·personal" 
(e.g.. life . health. ancl disability) insurance'"). 
73. See, e.g.. U.C.C. § 9-104(g) (NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft 1995) (covering security 
interests in insurance policies other than those covering healthcare costs. an injury to or 
disability of an individual. the loss of employment or income by an individual. or funeral or 
burial costs). 
74. The insurance -premium-finance industry was concerned that inclusion in Revised 
Articl e 9 would impose upon financers a filing requirement not contained in the non-Article 9 
law of most jurisdictions. 
1999] REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS 1375 
the UCC filings before deciding whom to pay) and that others (e.g., 
the concern that the insurer would be obligated to pay the secured 
party upon receipt of a notification of assignment) could be addressed 
with special rules that would not require insurers to change their way 
of doing business. At its meeting in June 1996, the Drafting 
Committee voted five to three in favor of including insurance within 
the scope of Revised Article 9.75 
Immediately following the vote, we asked for guidance on the 
substance of some of the special rules that might be needed. These 
preliminary discussions highlighted the complexity that might be 
necessary to bring insurance-related collateral into Revised Article 9 
without upsetting current practices and prompted the Drafting 
Committee to reconsider its decision. On reconsideration , apparently 
motivated by the substantial thought required to address this complex 
subject properly and the limited time in which to do so, the Drafting 
Committee unanimously opposed including insurance policies within 
the scope of Revised Article 9. We were asked, however, to consider 
any special scope or other provisions that might be necessary to 
facilitate the financing of what Revised Article 9 now calls "health-
care-insurance receivables," i.e. , rights to payment for health-care 
goods or services which arise under an insurance policy.76 
From the perspective of the health-care provider, these 
receivables are the equivalent of traditional accounts-rights to 
payment for goods sold or services rendered .77 Revised Article 9 
classifies them as such.78 Accordingly, the assignment (whether an 
outright sale or an assignment to secure an obligation) of health-care-
insurance receivables by a provider to a financer is a secured 
transaction governed by Revised Article 9. A financing statement 
must be filed to perfect the financer's security interest. However, 
because the account debtor on a health-care-insurance receivable is 
an insurer, and because the Drafting Committee did not wish to upset 
established practices concerning the insurer's obligation to pay, some 
75. The Drafting Committee ·s vo te did not address the inclusion of co nsumer insurance 
poli cies as original collate ral in Revised Article 9. Representat ives of cons um er- advocacy 
groups op posed the inclusion. particula rly of life insurance policies. They prefe rred instea d to 
maintain the status quo. und e r which sec urity interes ts in ri ghts und e r life insurance policies arc 
gove rned by non-Article 9 law in most jurisdictions. Regulating sec urity inte rests un de r non -
Article 9 law. they argued , has th e practical effect of m aking credit secured by insurance policies 
much less avai lable than it would be under an A rticle 9 regime . We agreed . but thought this to 
be a cogent reason fo r bringing these tra nsactions into R ev ised Artic le 9. 
76. SeeR. § 9-1 02( a)(46) (defining "health-ca re-insurance rece iva ble"). 
77. See U .C.C. § 9-106 (de finin g " accou nt''). 
78. See R. § 9- 102(a)(2) . 
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of the rules ordinarily applicable to account debtors on traditional 
accounts, such as trade receivables, were thought to be inappropriate 
to account debtors on health-care-insurance receivables. In particular, 
Revised Article 9 generally invalidates both contractual and legal 
restrictions on assignments of accounts. 79 It provides that, 
notwithstanding an agreement or law to the contrary, an account 
debtor that has been properly notified that the account has been 
assigned may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee but not 
by paying the assignor.80 But although Revised Article 9 overrides 
contractual and legal restrictions on assignment with respect to the 
creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest in health-
care-insurance receivables, it does not override these restrictions with 
respect to the rights and duties of the account debtor.81 Thus, other 
law, and not Revised Article 9, determines whom an account debtor 
on a health-care-insurance receivable must pay to discharge its 
obligation under an insurance policy.s2 
The term "health-care-insurance receivable" is not limited to 
rights enjoyed by providers. The patient 's right to payment under its 
health-care insurance policy is also a health-care-insurance 
receivable.03 It, too, is classified as an "account," even though the 
patient's right to payment is not of a type that is included even in the 
broader definition of the term in Revised Article 9. ~~ Thus, Revised 
Article 9 governs the patient 's assignment (both outright and for 
collateral purposes) of insurance benefits to his health-care provider. 
Such an assignment creates a security interest in an account. To 
facilitate the continuation of established practices, however, the 
security interest is perfected when it attaches; no filing against the 
patient is required.85 If the provider assigns the right to payment to its 
financer, however, the normal filing rules apply. 
D. Tort Claims 
The Study Committee recommended that the scope of Article 9 
be expanded to include security interests in claims (other than claims 
79. See id. § 9-406(d ) (con tract ual res trictions). (f ) (legal restrictions). 
RO. See id. § 9-406(a ). 
8 1. See id. § 9-408. 
82. See id. § 9-406(i) (making Revi sed section 9-406 in applicable to the ass ignment of a 
hea lth -ca re-insurance rece ivable ). 
83. See id. § 9-102(a)(46). 
84. See id. § 9-102(a)(2) (defining ··account" ). 
S5. See id. § 9-309(5) . 
' 
. ' 
i 
·i. 
. I 
! 
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for personal injury) arising out of tort, to the extent that the claims 
are assignable under applicable non-UCC law.86 With relatively little 
difficulty, the Drafting Committee decided to follow that recommen-
dationP Revised Article 9 governs security interests in an otherwise 
assignable "commercial tort claim" as original collateral.B8 All tort 
claims of organizations are commercial tort claims.89 As for tort claims 
of individuals, only those that arise in the course of the claimant's 
business or profession and do not include damages arising out of 
personal injury to or the death of the claimant are commercial tort 
claims.90 
Revised Article 9 includes very few special rules governing 
commercial tort claims. One set reflects that tortfeasors are not 
typical of those who owe money. Unlike most unreified rights to 
payment, a "commercial tort claim" is neither an account nor a 
general intangible;91 it is a separate type of collateral. Because the 
tortfeasor is not an "account debtor,"92 notification of an assignment 
does not affect the tortfeasor's obligation to pay unless other law so 
provides.93 Moreover, Revised Article 9's free-assignability 
provisions, which generally override any contract or non-Article 9 law 
restricting assignment of a right to payment, do not extend to 
assignments of commercial tort claims.94 
Another set of special rules for commercial tort claims was 
designed to reduce the likelihood that a debtor inadvertently will 
encumber a tort claim. Unlike most collateral, which may be 
described in a security agreement by type (e.g. , "all general 
intangibles"), a commercial tort claim must be described with greater 
specificity (e.g., "all tort claims arising out of the explosion at my 
86. See Recommendation 4.A .. REPORT, supra note 1, a t 58. 
87. The Drafting Committee benefited from the generous cooperation of Hugh E. 
Reyn olds, liaison to the Drafting Committee from the Tort and Insurance Practice Section of 
the American Bar Association. 
88. See R. §§ 9-109(d)(12) (excluding assignmen ts of a claim arising in tort, o ther than a 
commercial tort claim) , 9-401(a) (providing that law other than Revised Article 9 determines 
whethe r a de btor 's ri ghts in collatera l ma y be transferred). 
89. See id. § 9-102(a)(l3)(A) : see also U.C.C. § 1-201(28) (defining "organization"). 
90. SeeR. § 9-102(a)(l3)(B). The Study Committee a lso recommended tha t the Draftin g 
Committee consider se riously whether to expand the scope of Article 9 to include security 
inte rests in claims for personal injury arising o ut of tort. See Recommendation 4.B ., R EPORT. 
supra note 1. at 58 . The Draft ing Committee decided against this expansion. 
91. See R. § 9-102(a)(2) (de fining "account"), (a)(42) (de fin ing "general intangible '') . 
92. See id. § 9-1 02(a)(3) (defining "account debtor" ). 
93. Cf. id. § 9-406(a) (provid ing th at after notifica tion of an assignment, an account debtor 
may discharge it s ob liga tion by paying the assignee but not by payi ng the assignor). 
94. See id. §§ 9-401. 9-406( d). (f), 9-407 to 9-409. 
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factory on May 5 of the present year"). 95 Consistent with this 
approach, a security interest does not attach to after-acquired tort 
claims.96 
Finally, the comments reflect the Study Committee 's recommen-
dation that Article 9 or the official comments "be revised to make 
clear that Article 9 applies to security interests in rights to payment 
that derive from claims arising out of tort (e.g. , rights to payment 
under a settlement agreement or a promissory note given to evidence 
liability in tort). "97 
E. Deposit Accounts 
As we discussed above in Part II , Revised Article 9 generally 
follows the Study Committee's recommendation that debtors be free 
to use deposit accounts as original collateral under the Article. The 
Study Committee recognized that including deposit accounts as 
original collateral "undoubtedly would raise a host of other difficult 
legal issues. "98 In addition to the exclusion for consumer transactions 
and the perfection and "take free" rules described above, the 
inclusion of deposit accounts as original collateral required the ,, 
promulgation of special rules governing choice of law,99 priority,Hxl the 
rights of the bank at which the deposit account is maintained,10 1 and 
enforcement. 102 It also contributed to the v-=ry complicated rules 
governing priority in proceeds . 103 Nevertheless, we would like to 
believe that " these complexities do indeed fit together, and snugly. "H14 
F. Fixtures and Other Real Property 
Article 9 applies primarily to personal property. However, it also 
implicates interests in real property. For example, it applies to 
security interests in fixtures and to security interests in notes secured 
by mortgages of real property. Of the many recommendations 
95. See id. § 9-108(b)(3). (e)(l) . 
96. See id. § 9-204(b) (2) . 
97. Recommendation 4.C.. R EPORT, supra note 1. at 58: see R. § 9-109 cmt. 15 . 
98. RE PORT. supra note 1. at 69. 
99. See R . § 9-304 . 
100. See id. § 9-327 . 
10 1. See id. §§ 9-340 to 9-342. 
102. See id. ~ 9-607(a )(4)-(5). 
103. See id. § 9-322(c) -(e). These ru les are discussed be low in Pa rt IV.A .3 and in Marke ll. 
supra note 33. at 989-91. 
104. Marke ll. supra no te 33 , at 1027. 
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concerning the interplay between Article 9 and the law of real 
property which arose from the Study Committee process, the most 
controversial surely was the recommendation that Article 9 provide 
that perfection in a note or other obligation secured by real property 
be achieved by perfection as to the obligation under Article 9 in the 
same manner as if the obligation were not secured by the real 
property. 105 The controversy was enhanced when, very early in the 
process, the Drafting Committee decided that filing would become a 
method of perfecting security interests in a mortgage note or other 
instrument.106 
From the outset, we considered the Study Committee's recom-
mendation to be wholly unremarkable. The prevailing non-UCC law 
long has been that a mortgage is incident to any note it secures; rights 
in the mortgage follow ownership of the note. 107 It follows that if an 
assignee acquires rights in the note that are senior to those of the 
assignor's other creditors, the rights in the mortgage likewise are 
senior. Unfortunately, Former Article 9 did not address the point 
directly, and the official comment to Former section 9-102 led to 
substantial confusion and uncertainty. The Study Committee's recom-
mendation was simply that Revised Article 9 eliminate the confusion 
that had developed under the Former Article. We were quite 
surprised by the vehemence of the objections raised to codification of 
what we thought to be a relatively simple and virtually undisputed 
principle. 
Through discussions with the organized real-property bar, 
including representatives of the American Bar Association Section of 
Real Property, Probate, and Trust and the American College of Real 
Estate Lawyers, we discovered that a host of other issues had become 
entangled with the one implicated by the recommendation. Chief 
among these was the same "whom do I pay" issue that the Drafting 
Committee grappled with in a variety of other right-to-payment 
contexts, such as deposit accounts, letters of credit, and health-care-
insurance receivables. The principal concern was for mortgagors who 
would not know whom to pay in order to discharge their obligations 
on the note. If perfection of a security interest in a mortgage note 
could be achieved by filing , and if an assignee need not record an 
105. See Recomme ndation 5.8 .. REPORT. supra no te l. at 61. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 13-1 6. 
107. See, e.g. , Carpenter v. Longan. 83 U.S. (16 W all.) 271. 275 (1872) ("An assignment of 
ihe no te ca rries the mortgage with it. while an ass ignment of the la tte r alo ne is a nullity. " ): 
D avid G. Epste in , Security Transfers by Sewred Parries , 4 GA. L. RE V. 527 . 534 (1970). 
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assignment of the mortgage in the real property records in order to 
ensure perfection, we were asked repeatedly, how would a 
homeowner or other mortgagor know whom to pay? The proposed 
revision of Article 9, we were told, would exacerbate the risk of a 
mortgagor having to pay the mortgage debt twice. 
Of course, nothing could be further from the truth. The law of 
obligations determines whom an obligor must pay to discharge the 
obligation. Revised section 9-406, which applies to obligations that 
are not evidenced by an "instrument," is part of the law of 
obligations. It contains the "notification" rule that the real-property 
bar advocated: The account debtor can discharge its obligation by 
paying the original obligee until but not after the account debtor 
receives notification that the right to payment has been assigned ; 
after notification, payment to the assignee will discharge the 
obligation, but payment to the assignor will not. 108 Neither the filing of 
a financing statement nor the recording of an assignment of mortgage 
affects this rule .w9 
If the obligation is embodied in an instrument, law other than 
Article 9 governs. If the instrument is not negotiable, that law is the 
common law. According to the Restatement of Mortgages, most 
reported decisions "giv[ e] the mortgagor no credit for payments 
innocently made to the mortgagee" after the mortgage note has been 
transferred. 11 0 Nevertheless, the Restatement rejects that view as 
"completely impractical" and as having "the potential for great 
injustice to mortgagors. "111 It adopts a "notification" rule instead. 112 
As with the notification rule under Revised Article 9, neither the 
filing of a financing statement nor the recording of an assignment of 
mortgage affects the mortgagor 's obligation to pay. 113 If the 
instrument is negotiable , the "merger" principle will apply. Under 
108. SeeR. § 9-406(a). 
109. This discussion assumes the absence of legisla tion overriding R evised Article 9 and 
creating a different rule for discharging obligations on mortgage notes. 
110. See R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.5 cmt. a. at 391 (1997). 
111. !d. 
112. "Except as otherwise provided by the Unifo rm Commercial Code, afte r transfer of a n 
ob liga tion secured by a mortgage , pe rformance o f the obligation to the transferor is effec ti ve 
against the transferee if rendered before the ob ligor receives notice of the transfer." !d. § 5.5. a t 
390. 
113. See R. § 9-406(a) (account debtor may discharge his obli gation by paying the assigno r 
"until , but not after, the account debtor rece ives a notificat ion" of assignment) ; U. C.C. 
§ 1-201(26) (person " receives" a notification when it comes to his at tention or is duly delivered): 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.5 cmt. c. at 395. However. a 
comment to the Resta te ment suggests that recordatio n of an assignment of mortgage imparts 
notice to a grantee who buys the mortgaged land after recordat io n. See id. 
i:. 
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this principle, the obligation is bound up in and transferred with the 
paper on which it is written; notification is irrelevant. UCC Article 3 
follows the merger principle. It provides that the makers' obligation 
on a negotiable note may be discharged by paying a person entitled to 
enforce the instrument ("PETE"). 114 To qualify as a PETE, a person 
normally must be in possession of the instrument. 115 Thus, if the 
mortgagee assigns the mortgage note but the assignee does not take 
possession, the note can be discharged by paying the mortgagee as if 
no assignment had been made. Payment to the assignee will not 
discharge the obligation. As under the Restatement and Article 9, 
neither the filing of a financing statement nor the recording of an 
assignment of mortgage affects this rule. 
In short, Revised Article 9 leaves the law of obligations, and the 
obligations of a mortgagor, exactly where they were . In the end, the 
real-property bar acknowledged this and turned their attention to 
repeal of the merger rule in Article 3. Although the leadership of 
NCCUSL added this issue to the agenda of the Article 9 Drafting 
Committee, it did so very near the end of the drafting proces<s. In 
conjunction with its consideration of expanding the scope of Article 9 
to include sales of promissory notes, at its last full meeting the 
Drafting Committee considered the "whom to pay" issue. Although 
there appeared to be general support for the notification rule, the 
Drafting Committee was reluctant to recommend overturning a 
fundamental principle of negotiable instruments law without 
sufficient time to consider all the ramifications of the change. In 
particular, it was unable to reach consensus on how broadly the 
merger principle should be supplanted (e.g., should the notification 
rule apply to all notes secured by real property? all secured notes? all 
installment notes?) or on the statutory mechanism for making the 
change. The issue , which continues to draw great interest from the 
real-property bar, remains on NCCUSL's agenda. It has been 
assigned to the Drafting Committee to Revise U CC Article 1. 116 
The Drafting Committee also decided not to limit to real-
property collateral its codification of the principle that the collateral 
follows the debt. Revised Article 9 is intended to make clear that this 
114. See U.C.C. § 3-4 12. The obligati on also runs to an indorser who paid the in strument 
after dishonor. See id. 
115. See id. § 3-301 (defining ··person entitled to enforce"). 
116. For a detailed chronology of the efforts to e nsure th at the notificat io n rule applies to all 
mortgage notes . both negotiabl e and nonnego tiabl e . see Dale A. Whitman. Refo rming rhe Law: 
The Paymel1f Rule as a Paradigm. 1998 BYU L. R EV. 1169. 
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principle applies to attachment and perfection of security interests in 
all secured obligations, whether secured by personal property or real 
property. 117 Only time will tell whether it ultimately will succeed in 
doing so. There is a risk to codifying this basic common-law principle. 
A court may assume that because "everyone knows" that the 
collateral follows the debt, the new statutory provisions must mean 
something at least a little different. 1 1 ~ That something different may 
be inconsistent with Revised Article 9. 
III. ARTICLE 9 FILING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERACTION OF ARTICLE 
9 WITH NON-UCC LAW 
In Hard Choices we spoke approvingly of the Study Committee 's 
willingness to address matters that are outside the UCC but affect 
secured transactions. We praised "the reluctance of the current group 
of UCC law reformers to shy away from goals that are more 
ambitious than revisions to statutory text." 119 In this connection, we 
referred to the Study Committee 's recommendations that the 
sponsors of the UCC "encourage and support the ongoing efforts to 
improve and make more uniform the various state systems for filing 
... and conducting searches[;]" 121 ' that the perfection, priority , and 
enforcement provisions of Article 9 be extended to statutory 
agricultural liens; 121 and that federal law governing copyrights, 
patents, and other intellectual property be revised , and federal 
recording systems for interests in intellectual property be reformed, 
to facilitate secured transactions. 122 
A. Improving th e Filing Systern 
To a considerable extent, the sponsors and Drafting Committee 
had the ability to implement the first two of these recommendations 
in the statute itself, and they rose to the occasion. Revised Article 9 
contains several provisions that promote efficiency and uniformity in 
the operations of filing offices. For example, Revised sections 9-516 
117. Sef' R. ~s 9-203(g). 9-30K(e) . 
11 0. Leaving to the common law the a rticul a ti o n o f funda me nta l princip les un de rl ying 
com me rcial law also poses a ri sk. Se!' Steve n L Harris. Using Fundamenial Principles of 
Conunacial Lmv 10 Decidf' UCC Cases. 2!1 Lew. L.A. L R EV. 637 ( 1993 ). 
119. Harris & Mooney. supra no te l. a t 575. 
120. R ecom me nda tion 1 L A. . R EPORT. supra no te 1. at 88. 
121. 5 f'e Recomme nclatio n 24.A..id..at 181. 
122. 5 1'1' Recomme ndations 2.A. -F.. id .. at 50-51. 
1999] REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS 1383 
and 9-520 underscore that filing offices serve a ministerial, rather than 
regulatory, function. Taken together, they contain an exclusive list of 
grounds for rejecting a financing statement or other record that is 
communicated to a filing office 123 and require a filing office that 
rejects a record to promptly inform the filer of the fact of and reason 
for the rejection. 124 To further insure that filers of written financing 
statements are not burdened by idiosyncratic requirements imposed 
by individual filing offices, Revised section 9-521 contains forms for 
initial financing statements and amendments which each filing office 
must accept (assuming it accepts written records). Revised section 
9-519(f) facilitates searches of the public records by requiring a filing 
office to be capable of retrieving an initial financing statement and all 
amendments and other filed records relating to it either by the 
debtor's name or by the file number assigned to the initial financing 
statement. 125 Revised section 9-523 increases the utility of responses 
to search requests by requiring a filing office to respond to requests 
promptly and with current and complete information. 126 
The Drafting Committee realized that dictating the minimum 
services a filing office must provide and setting the minimum 
performance standards for providing those services are appropriate 
subjects for legislation, but specifying the details of day-to-day filing-
office operations is not. Detailed procedures specified in statutes 
cannot be changed easily enough to enable filing offices to adjust to 
changes in filing load, personnel, and technology. Particularly given 
the substantial differences among Article 9 filing offices (in their 
current operations, in the quantity of filings processed, and in the 
number of employees who do the processing), imposing absolute 
uniformity of practices and procedures would be both unnecessary 
and unwise. Yet, because filers and searchers often deal with many 
filing offices, great value would come from having filing-office 
practices and procedures be harmonious with one another. Revised 
section 9-526 is a useful step toward realizing that value. This section 
123. SeeR~~ 9-520(a). 9-516(b). 
124. See id. ~ 9-520(b) (requ iring filin g office to ac t no t later than two busi ness days after it 
rece ives the record). 
125. A filin g office must ass ign a unique numbe r to each fil ed record. See id. ~ 9-519(a)(l). 
The "fil e number'' is the number ass ign ed to an initial financing statement. See id. 
~ 9- 102(a)(36) (de fining "file num be r" ). 
126. See id. s 9-523(c)( l) (requiring filin g office to communica te. upon requ es t. th e 
information provided in fin ancing statements o n fil e as of a date no ea rlier than three business 
days before filing office rece ives the request). (e ) (requirin g filin g office to act not la ter th an two 
business da ys afte r it recei ves the request). 
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requires the adoption and publication of filing-office rules after 
consultation with other filing offices and after consideration of the 
rules and practices of, and technology used by, other Article 9 filing 
offices. Revised section 9-526 requires the rule-adopting official or 
agency also to consult the Model Rules promulgated by the 
International Association of Corporate Administrators ("IACA"), an 
organization of administrators responsible for statewide corporate 
and UCC filings. 127 
The process leading to the promulgation of the Model Rules 
demonstrates the value of the sponsors' working with other interested 
groups towards improving matters that cannot be addressed usefully 
by statute. Links between Article 9's sponsors and IACA began to 
form as early as 1991, when Harry C. Sigman, a member of the Study 
Committee, addressed an IACA annual meeting about efforts to 
revise Article 9. Funding provided by the Article 9 Filing Project 128 
enabled Mr. Sigman and other experts in Article 9 to meet regularly 
with IACA members and assist them in fashioning the Model Rules 
during the succeeding years. Input from filing officers was not limited 
to formulation of the Model Rules. After the filing provisions of 
Revised Article 9 took shape, we met with a small group of filing 
officers to discuss the provisions in detail, and we engaged in many e-
mail exchanges with filing officers throughout the revision process. 
The beneficial effects of the filing officers' participation in the 
process are likely to extend well beyond Revised Article 9 and the 
Model Rules. Filing officers not only became better educated about 
the needs of those who use the system but also, for the first time, 
systematically shared with one another their ideas about, and 
experiences with, a wide range of software and hardware products. 
The information and insights gained from IACA-related discussions 
already has enabled several filing offices to modernize and improve 
their operations. Perhaps most important, the filing officers appear to 
have come away from the revision project with an appreciation that 
they are engaged in a common enterprise under a uniform law. This 
constructive attitude bodes well for improved filing-office operations 
under Revised Article 9. 
Other efforts stimulated by the revision also are likely to 
contribute to progress toward making the Article 9 filing systems 
127. The final version of the Model Rules is expected to be promulgated by the end of 1999. 
128. NCCUSL established the Article 9 Filing Project at the University of Minnesota to 
study and address problems with the filing system and to promote nonstatutory solutions, such 
as the promulgation of filing-office rules. 
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uniform. Of particular note are the standards for UCC electronic 
filing promulgated by the American National Standards Institute 
("ANSI"). 129 These standards, along with an Implementation Guide,13° 
will assist filing offices in implementing an electronic filing system 
under Article 9. A version of the Implementation Guide suitable for 
use with Revised Article 9 is expected to appear shortly. This version 
will facilitate a quick transition to Revised Article 9 and, for those 
filing offices that have not yet gone on line by Revised Article 9's 
effective date of July 1, 2001,131 to electronic filing. 
B. Agricultural Financing 
The sponsors were successful in reaching outside their own 
organizations also when fashioning the treatment of statutory 
agricultural liens. As we noted in Hard Choices, two American Bar 
Association task forces invested much time and thought into 
proposals for improving Article 9's treatment of agricultural finance 
and regularizing the treatment of statutory agricultural liens. 132 
Revised Article 9 adopts many of the recommendations of those task 
forces. Several of its provisions clarify or otherwise improve the law 
applicable to security interests in agricultural collateral. 133 
Despite years of work, and despite what appeared to be a widely 
shared view that Former section 9-312(2) was unworkable,134 neither 
the Drafting Committee nor the ABA task forces succeeded in 
forging a consensus among themselves or among the interested 
groups on one important question relating to agricultural finance: to 
what extent, if any, should Revised Article 9 afford priority to 
security interests in crops that secure new value (e.g., seed or 
129. Transaction Se t 154 of A NSI X1 2 relates to electronic U CC filings. 
130. An Implementation Guide for use with the Former Article was approved by the 
Secured Transactions Section of IACA in 1999. 
131. See R. §9-7tH. For a discussion of the rules gove rning the transition to the revised 
A rticle. see Bradley Y. Smith, New Anicle 9 Transition Rules , 74 CHI.-KENT L. R EV. 1339 
(1999). 
132. See Harris & Mooney. supra note L at 576. 
133. Compare U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (definition of " farm products" ) with R. § 9-102(a) (34) 
(revised de finiti on of " farm products"). See R. § 9-324(d) (new priority for purchase-money 
security interests in livestock) . Cornpare U.C.C. §§ 9-203(l)(a): and 9-402(1) (requiring security 
agreement and fin ancing statement covering crops to describe the real property concerned) wiLh 
R. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A): and 9-502(a)-(b) (containing no such requirements). Compare U.C.C. 
§ 9-401 (1) (second and third alternatives) (requiring local filing to perfect a security interes t in 
crops ) with R. * 9-501 (a ) (requiring filing in central filing office). 
134. Former section 9-312(2) affo rded special priority to those who provide secured credit 
that enables a debtor to produce crops. 
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fertilizer) that is used in the production of the crops? Apparently 
recognizing that the fifty state legislatures were no more likely than 
other groups to agree about the desirability of a special priority for 
"production-money security interests" ("PrMSis"), the Drafting 
Committee decided that the provisions for PrMSI priority should be 
presented to the states as optional. This proposal was met with a 
campaign orchestrated by the American Bankers Association against 
the provisions in fall1997. Despite its intensity, 135 the campaign was of 
limited effect. The draft preceding the hubbub presented the PrMSI 
provisions in bracketed sections, each accompanied by a Legislative 
Note indicating that "This section is optional."136 Ultimately, the 
brackets surrounding the prov1s10ns were removed, and the 
provisions were relocated to Appendix II, which refers to them as 
"model provisions." 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Revised Article 9 as it 
relates to agricultural financing concerns the scope of the revised 
Article. Many of the provisions relating to perfection by filing, 
priority, and enforcement apply not only to consensual security 
interests but also to the vast array of "agricultural liens" created by 
statute in each state. 137 These provisions afford a clear, easy, and 
uniform way for a holder of any one of these diverse agricultural liens 
to obtain priority over the debtor's judicial lien creditors and 
bankruptcy trustee, 13~ to ascertain the agricultural lien's priority as 
135. Along with the members of the Drafting Committee, we were subjected to a barrage of 
more than a thousand "'form'' letters arguing against the inclusion of any PrMSI rules in Revised 
Article 9. It was not uncommon for a single bank to have sent several pieces of mail, the 
contents of which were identical save for the name and signature of the individual bank officer 
or employee . The quantity was so great that the postal service reportedly refused to continue 
deliverii1g mail to one Drafting Committee member, who was asked to pick up the mail at the 
post office instead. 
136. U.C.C. ~§ 9-105. 9-321 (Reporters' Interim Draft Aug. 7. 1997). 
137. "'Agricultural lien" means an interest. other than a security interest. m farm 
products: 
(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for: 
(i) goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor's farming operation: 
or 
(ii) rent on rea l property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming 
operation: 
(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that: 
(i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished goods or services to a debtor 
in connection with a debtor's farming operation: or 
(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with the debtor's farming 
operation: and 
(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person's possession of the personal 
propertv. 
R. § 9-102(a)(5). 
138. See id. §§ 9-310(a) (financing statement must be filed to perfect agricultural lien), 
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against conflicting security interests and agricultural liens in the same 
collateral,139 and to enforce the agriculturallien.140 At the same time, 
by subjecting agricultural liens to Article 9's filing requirements, 
Revised Article 9 enables potential secured lenders to ascertain with 
ease and at low cost, by searching the Article 9 filing records, whether 
farm products previously have been encumbered with an agricultural 
lien. 141 This statutory approach proved so popular that some people 
questioned why it should be limited to agricultural liens on farm 
products. They urged the Drafting Committee to extend the 
perfection and priority provisions of Revised Article 9 to cover all 
nonpossessory statutory liens on all kinds of collateral. 142 The 
potential advantages of such an expansion of Article 9's scope were 
evident. However, the world of nonagricultural, nonpossessory 
statutory liens is vast and, at least to some extent, unknown. Lacking 
a practical way of determining all the types of liens that would be 
implicated by expanding Revised Article 9 to cover all these liens, the 
Drafting Committee understandably declined to proceed. 
C. Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property 
The Study Committee's recommendation that the law governing 
security interests in copyrights, patents, and other intellectual 
property be revised necessarily implicates federal law, which 
generally speaking lies outside the bailiwick of the UCC's sponsors. 
While the Drafting Committee was revising Article 9 to deal 
expressly with software financing and other issues relating to 
intellectual property collateral,143 efforts at making federal 
intellectual-property law more conducive to contemporary patterns of 
commercial finance continued. These efforts, which have yet to bear 
9-317(a)(1) (unperfected agricultural lien is subordinate to rights of a lien creditor) . 
9-l02(a)(52) (defining '· lie n cred itor" ). 
139. See id. § 9-322(a). (g) . 
140. The holde r of an agricultural lien m ay enforce th e agricultural lien unde r Revi sed 
Article 9 by repossessing and disposing of the collateral o r by accepting the colla te ral in 
satisfaction o f the ob ligation it secures. See id. § 9-60l(a). 
14 1. See id. § 9-322(a ) (affo rding priority to the first to fil e or perfect ). Bur see id. § 9-322(g) 
(affording priority to later-filed agricultura l lie n if the statute creat ing the agricultural lien so 
provides). 
142. An American Bar Association subcommittee so ught more modest change. It 
recomme nded th a t Re vised Article 9 govern o nly the prior ity be tween a no nagricultu ral 
statutory li en and an Article 9 sec urity interest. See R EPORT AND RE COMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RELATION TO OTHER LAW OF THE ABA B US INESS LAW SECTION 
UNIFORM COMM ERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE (Oct. 1996). 
143. F or a discuss ion of th ese issues, see Steven 0. Weise, Th e Financin g of lntel/euuul 
Property Under Revised UCC Article 9. 74 CHI. -K ENT L. REV. 1077 (1999). 
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fruit, have proceeded under the auspices of the American Bar 
Association and, more recently, the Commercial Finance 
Association. 144 We are uncertain whether the involvement of the 
UCC's sponsors (assuming it would have been welcome) would have 
been a wise allocation of their resources or would have led to 
enactment of improved federal legislation. 145 Regardless, we are 
disappointed that interested parties have not yet succeeded in 
spurring Congress into action. 
IV. APPROACHES TO CODIFICATION: FINE LINES, ROUGH JUSTICE, 
COMPLEXITY, AND SIMPLICITY IN REVISED ARTICLE 9 
The ultimate success of Revised Article 9 will depend not only 
on the quality of substantive rules it adopts but also on its appropriate 
application by lawyers and judges. Its appropriate application, in turn, 
will depend in large part on the way in which the substantive rules are 
articulated and organized. 
As we noted in Hard Choices: 
One of the virtues of Article 9 is that most of its provisions are 
readily accessible to lawyers who are familiar with its general 
outlines. In revising Article 9, the Drafting Committee will be 
expected not only to determine questions of Article 9's policy and 
scope but also to embody its choices in statutory language that 
preserves its accessibility. 146 
We were mindful of this challenge throughout the drafting 
process. And we were not alone. In several contexts the statutory 
approach that was taken (or rejected) generated more controversy 
than the substance of the rule it articulated. Moreover, we received a 
good deal of assistance in making sure that terminology and style 
were consistent throughout the revised Article. 147 This consistency 
144. The American Bar Association's Joint Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual 
Property, composed of lawyers from the Sections of Business Law and Intellectual Property 
Law, is preparing the Federal Intellectual Property Security Act. This Act would govern 
security interests in all federally regulated intellectual property, including copyrights and 
patents. The Commercial Finance Association, a trade organization of asset-based lenders, is 
supporting the enactment of the Security Interests in Copyrights Financing Protection Act. 
which , as the name implies. is a more modest reform effort. 
145. Some participants in the Article 9 revision process have participated actively in these 
federal Jaw-reform efforts, as well. Although the Study Committee took a somewhat more 
active role with respect to reform of federal law than did the Drafting Committee. see Harris & 
Mooney, supra note 1, at 575, the Drafting Committee had more than enough challenges 
without concerning itself with reforming federal law. 
146. /d. at 587. 
147. For a discussion of the Drafting Committee's efforts in this regard and those of its 
simplification task force, see Louis F. Del Duca et al., Simplification in Drajiing- The Uniform 
1999] REFLECTIONS OF THE REPORTERS 1389 
serves to render an already accessible statute even more accessible. 
Of course, accessibility requires not only that each individual 
sentence be comprehensible but also that users of the statute are able 
to find all the relevant provisions and understand how the provisions 
relate to one another. Despite widespread satisfaction with much of 
the Former Article, Revised Article 9 contains myriad changes. As 
one of us quipped during the drafting process, "Everyone agrees that 
Article 9 works fairly well and only needs a handful of material 
revisions. The problem is that everyone has a different handful." 
Even if the inclusion of any single complex provision or set of rules 
does not give rise to a serious problem, the sheer number of complex 
and detailed rules in the aggregate may. 
When taken in the aggregate and in the abstract, the revised 
Article may appear forbidding. But articles of the UCC are not 
novels, to be read through from beginning to end. Approached in a 
given transactional context, Revised Article 9 should prove to be 
readily navigable. It has been substantially reorganized with the new 
user in mind. That the reorganization was wholeheartedly supported 
by experts whose familiarity with (and investment in) the 
organization of Former Article 9 vastly exceeds that of the average 
user gives us reason to believe that the revised Article's organization 
will accomplish its intended purpose. 
In Hard Choices we addressed the dichotomy between two 
differing paradigms. One would create finely crafted, individualized 
statutory lines that seek to work nearly perfect justice over a detailed 
taxonomy of circumstances. The other would offer rougher and 
blunter, albeit simpler, bright-line rules that, while normatively 
suboptimal in some circumstances, would yield the desired result in 
the mine run of cases. Of course, the fine lines versus rough justice 
dichotomy discussed in Hard Choices is but one of several classes of 
drafting choices along a broad spectrum. As one might expect, the 
revision includes examples of clear lines, enormous complexity, 
purposefully incomplete treatment of issues, general standards for 
courts to develop and apply as the circumstances require, and mere 
silence, leaving courts to interpolate both standards and results. 
In the discussion that follows we provide a few examples of 
issues whose complexity tested our ability and that of the Drafting 
Committee to maintain the Article's accessibility by avoiding 
unnecessary complexity. We also speculate briefly on the likely causes 
Comm ercial Code Anicle 9 Experience. 74 CHI.- KENT L REV. 1309 (1999). 
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of the complexity. We conclude by noting some instances in which the 
Drafting Committee chose to address issues with considerably less -
in some cases, perhaps too little-detail. 
A. (Possibly) Unnecessary Complexity 
1. Changes in Business Structure 
In Hard Choices we examined the Study Committee's recom-
mendations concerning the effect of certain changes in business 
structure on security agreements that contain after-acquired property 
provisions. We focused on two paradigmatic examples. The first was 
the transfer by an individual owner-operator of a sole proprietorship 
(A) of all of the business assets to a newly-formed corporation (B) 
owned by the individual. The second was a merger of a corporation 
(A) into another (surviving) corporation (B). Each case assumed that 
B, the transferee, continues to carry on the business of A, the 
transferor. Each case also assumed that A had entered into a security 
agreement in favor of SP-A covering all existing and after-acquired 
collateral (e.g., accounts and inventory) and that SP-A had filed a 
financing statement against A. The principal controversy arose with 
respect to collateral acquired by B following the transfer. 14"' First, to 
what extent should the security agreement originally entered into by 
A be sufficient to create a security interest in collateral acquired by 
B? Second, if the security agreement is so effective, to what extent 
should the financing statement filed against A be sufficient to perfect 
the security interest in collateral acquired by B? Third, if the security 
interest is so perfected, what priority rule should govern a contest 
between SP-A's security interest and that of SP-B , in whose favor B 
entered into a security agreement? 
The Report recommended that the official comments be revised 
to indicate that other (i.e. , non-Article 9) law governs the answer to 
the first question-whether and to what extent the security agreement 
148. Re la ted questions concern the e ffec t of the transfer on SP-A's security interest in the 
rransferred coll a te ral and the effect of a " pure" cha nge of name. i. e ., when A 's name changes to 
B but no new entity is involved. Whil e not comple te ly free from controversy. the resolution of 
these issues und er Revised Article 9 is simil a r to that under its predecessor. SP-A ·s security 
inte res t no rm all y cont inues in. and a fin ancing statement fi led against A continues to be 
effec ti ve with respect to . the transfe rred coll a te ral. even if SP-A does not file against /3. 
Compare R. §§ 9-3l5 (a). 9-507(a) 1virh U. C.C. *§ 9-306(2), 9-402(7) (third sente nce). In the case 
of a name change. a finan cing sta teme nt filed against A continues to be effective as to co ll ate ra l 
acquired by B within the fo ur-month pe ri od afte r the name change and thereafter only if an 
appropriate amendment to the finan cing sta te ment is filed. Compare R. § 9-507(c) wirh U.C.C. 
§ 9-402(7) (second sentence). 
I 
I 
t 
I 
! 
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originally entered into by A is effective to create a security interest in 
property acquired by B. 149 Revised Article 9, however, goes further. 
Consistent with the Report's recommendation, the revised Article 
provides that a person "becomes bound" as debtor under another 
person's security agreement when that result would occur by 
operation of other law or by contract. 150 Revised Article 9 adds to this 
trigger its own, additional, formula for when a person so "becomes 
bound" by another person's security agreement. Under Revised 
section 9-203, a person (here, B) "becomes bound" if "the person 
becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person, 
including the obligation secured under the security agreement, and 
acquires or succeeds to all or substantially all of the assets of the 
other person." 151 
Revised Article 9 follows the Report somewhat more closely 
with respect to the second and third questions. 152 As to the second 
question, under Revised section 9-508 SP-A's financing statement 
filed against A would remain effective to perfect its security interest 
in collateral acquired by B during the four-month period after B 
became bound by A's security agreement. The financing statement 
would remain effective to perfect the security interest in collateral 
acquired by B thereafter only if, during the four-month period, SP-A 
files a new initial financing statement against B. 153 
As recognized in the Report, maintaining SP-A's perfected 
security interest in collateral acquired by B necessitates new priority 
rules in order to answer the third question. Basing priority on the 
timing of financing statements filed by SP-A and SP-B against 
different debtors would make no sense. 15.j Revised section 9-326 
contains the new rules applicable to this variation of the "double-
debtor" problem. Under that section, a security interest perfected by 
a financing statement that is effective solely under Revised section 
9-508 generally is subordinate to security interests perfected by 
another method. 155 It follows that SP-B's security interest ordinarily 
would have priority. There are exceptions to this general 
149. See Recommendation 17.0 .. REPORT. supra note 1, at 142-43. 
150. SeeR.~ 9-203(d)(1). 
15 1. !d.§ 9-203( d)(2). 
152. See R ecommenda tio n 17.E. -F .. R EPORT. supra no te 1. a t 143-48. 
153. See R. ~ 9-508(b ). 
154. See Steve n L. H arris. Th e lnleracrion of Anicles 6 and 9 of !he Un iform Comm ercial 
Code: A Swdy in Conveyan cing, Priorilies, and Code fnl erprewrion, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179. 222-
25 ( 1986 ). 
155. See R. ~ 9-326(a). 
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subordination, however. As among security interests perfected solely 
under Revised section 9-508 (e.g., as among SP-A and other secured 
creditors of A), the other priority rules of Revised Article 9 apply 
(e.g., the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Revised section 9-322). 156 
Moreover, there is an exception to the exception. If security interests 
so perfected were not created by security agreements entered into by 
the same debtor (e.g., if B became bound by a security agreement 
originally entered into by C in favor of SP-C as well as by the security 
agreement entered into by A in favor of SP-A), the priority is 
governed by "priority in time of the new debtor's having become 
bound."157 The latter exception reflects another necessary 
accommodation of the "double-debtor" problem. 
The effort to protect the (possibly) unwitting SP-A from the risk 
that B, as a new debtor, might become bound by A's security 
agreement obviously has resulted in substantial additional 
complexity. Even so, the approach taken in Revised sections 9-326 
and 9-508 does not provide a complete resolution of SP-A's problems. 
For example, it may be purely fortuitous whether perfection of 
security interests in B's after-acquired collateral is governed by the 
law of the jurisdiction whose law governed perfection of SP-A's 
security interest in A's collateral. Assume that, for choice-of-law 
purposes under Revised Article 9, A is located in State X and B is 
located in State Y. 158 SP-A's financing statement filed in State X 
against A would not perfect SP-A's security interest in B's after-
acquired collateral. Although SP-A's financing statement would 
continue to be effective under Revised section 9-508, it would not 
perfect SP-A's security interest in B's collateral because it is not filed 
in State Y, the jurisdiction in which B is located. 159 Revised section 
9-316(a) would maintain for up to one year the perfection of SP-A's 
security interest in collateral transferred by A to B, notwithstanding a 
change in governing law. But that provision relates only to perfected 
security interests, which, by definition, have attached; 160 it does not 
apply to collateral acquired after the change in applicable law.161 
156. See id. § 9-326(b ). 
157. !d. 
158. Revised section 9-3()7 determines where a debtor is located for purposes of Revised 
Article 9's choice-of-law rules. 
159. SeeR.§ 9-301(1). 
160. See id. § 9-308(a) (security interest is perfected if it has attached and the applicable 
requirements for perfection have been satisfied). 
161. See id. § 9-316 cmt. 2 example 5. The result is the same under Former Article 9. See 
U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d), (3)(e). 
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One reasonably might question whether the extensive effort to 
address these was justified. We certainly did during the deliberations 
of both the Study Committee and the Drafting Committee, ultimately 
to no avail. In our view, were SP-A actually relying on the after-
acquired collateral, normally Article 9 would not be asking too much 
of SP-A to insist that it discover that a new debtor has entered (or is 
about to enter) the picture. We recognize, however, that how one 
evaluates these rules relating to changes in business structure may 
turn on the paradigm that one chooses to emphasize or believes to be 
the most typical. In the case of the corporate merger, it is a fairly safe 
bet that customary due diligence and the involvement of lawyers 
would result in SP-A's consent being sought and its rights protected. 
Those who focus on the sole proprietor who incorporates a small 
business may view the prospects for SP-A to protect itself as 
materially jeopardized without something like the statutory structure 
provided in Revised Article 9. 
2. Priorities in Proceeds of Collateral to Which Nontemporal Priority 
Rules Apply 
Former Article 9 dealt with priorities in proceeds in substantially 
the same way that it dealt with priorities in original collateral. Under 
Former section 9-312(6), for purposes of the first-to-file-or-perfect 
priority rule of Former section 9-312(5), the date of filing or 
perfection for original collateral also was the date for proceeds of the 
collateral. With one material exception -proceeds of collateral 
subject to a purchase money security interest under Former section 
9-312(3) or (4)-the Former Article otherwise was silent on the 
priority of security interests in proceeds. 162 The effect of this silence, 
however, was to make applicable the first-to-file-or-perfect rule. 
During the drafting process the Drafting Committee considered 
several existing and newly proposed "nontemporal" priority rules-
i.e., those not based on priority in time. 163 These included priority 
rules for security interests in deposit accounts (Revised section 
9-327), investment property (Revised section 9-328), letter-of-credit 
rights (Revised section 9-329), chattel paper and instruments 
(Revised section 9-330), and collateral subject to special priority rules 
162. One other exception was Former section 9-306(5). dealing with returned and 
repossessed goods. 
163. For a discussion of nontemporal priority rules in Revised Article 9. see Randal C. 
Picker. Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules. 74 CH!.-KENT L. REV. 1157 
(1999). 
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under Articles 3, 7, and 8 (Revised section 9-331). Because the special 
priority afforded by these rules is not temporal, some expressed 
concern that the priority would not carry over to proceeds. Indeed, 
both Former section 9-312(5) and (6) and Revised section 9-322(a) 
and (b) indicate that, in the absence of a contrary provision, the first-
to-file-or-perfect rule, not the relevant nontemporal priority rule, 
would apply to proceeds. Moreover, inasmuch as filing is not a 
permissible method of perfection for certain types of collateral 
covered by these nontemporal rules, the time of perfection would 
control priority.164 Because perfection is conditioned upon 
attachment, which is conditioned in turn upon the debtor's having 
rights in the collateral, perfection in proceeds of those types of 
collateral would not occur until the proceeds came into being as 
such. Ins 
In addition to concerns about the inapplicability of the 
nontemporal rules to proceeds, the prospect of fully extending the 
reach of the temporal priority rules to proceeds also generated 
concerns. For example, assume that on June 1 SP-1 perfects its 
security interest in a debtor's deposit account by control, on July 1 
SP-2 perfects its security interest in the debtor's inventory by filing, 
and on August 1 SP-1 files a financing statement covering inventory. 
The debtor then uses cash from the deposit account to purchase new 
inventory. Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule, SP-1 's security 
interest would have priority over that of SP-2, even though SP-2 filed 
first and a search failed to turn up SP-1 's filing (which had not yet 
been made). This effect, the Drafting Committee believed, would 
undermine the filing system. 
The solution reached by the Drafting Committee is an 
enormously complex and opaque set of priority rules found in 
subsections (c), (d), and (e) of Revised section 9-322. 166 The upshot is 
generally to extend the nontemporal priority to most proceeds, 167 but 
to apply a new first-to-file (not first-to-file-or-perfect) priority rule to 
proceeds consisting of the types of collateral for which filing is the 
typical means of perfection. 16~ 
Only time and experience will reveal whether the benefits of the 
164. SeeR.§§ 9-327 (deposit accounts). 9-329 (letter-of-credit rights). 
165. See id. §§ 9-203(b)(2). 9-308(a). 
166. For a general explanation of these rules. see R. § 9-322 cmts. 7-9. For an explanation 
focusing on the rules· application to deposit accounts. see Markell, supra note 33. at 991 -1000. 
167. SeeR.§ 9-322(c). 
168. See id. § 9-322(d)-(e). 
1 
.; 
l 
i 
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new rules on proceeds priorities outweigh the costs of complexity. If 
the rules were implicated only in the unusual case we would be much 
less concerned. However, as we explained above, one must confront 
and understand this scheme to reach the conclusion that the first-to-
file secured party claiming inventory or equipment will also have 
priority in after-acquired inventory or equipment purchased with cash 
proceeds of an encumbered deposit account-a scenario that may 
become very typical. 
3. The New Taxonomy of Receivables and Receivables-Related 
Provisions 
Former Article 9 classified collateral consisting of rights to 
payment into only four types: accounts, chattel paper, instruments, 
and general intangibles. 16'~ Nevertheless, as anyone who has taught a 
law school course on secured transactions knows well, this 
definitional structure and its treatment under Article 9 are both hard 
to teach and hard to learn. That said, the expanded receivables-
related definitional structure found in Revised Article 9 is 
substantially more complex. Revised Article 9 contains seven 
principal types of collateral consisting of rights to payment: accounts 
(which include health-care-insurance reveivables and certain kinds of 
as-extracted collateral) , chattel paper (which is subdivided into 
electronic chattel paper and tangible chattel paper) , instruments 
(subdivided into promissory notes and other instruments), letter-of-
credit rights , payment intangibles, supporting obligations, and 
commercial tort claims. If one counts the subcategories (i.e., as-
extracted collateral, health-care-insurance reveivables, electronic 
chattel paper, tangible chattel paper, and promissory notes) , there are 
twelve types of rights to payment under the revised Article. 
Obviously, the Drafting Committee did not create this structure 
just to make courses in secured transactions more challenging. The 
separately defined terms are needed for special rules, or special 
carve-outs from rules , applicable to a particular type of receivable. 
The definitional structure is merely the tip of the iceberg. 
Some of the receivables-related types of collateral are defined 
specially to accommodate special concerns of obligors on certain 
169. See U .C. C. §s 9- IOS(l)(b) (de fi ning ·'chatte l paper"") . ( i) (defi ning " instrument" ' ), 9-106 
(defining '"account'" and '"general intangibl e"). A lthough some ge nera l intangibles consist 
primarily of a right to payment. th e te rm as defin ed is much broader. For purposes of this 
disc ussi on we have no t included deposit acc ounts as a type of receivable. even th ough a deposit 
account consists of a right to payment. 
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rights to payment (among other reasons). For example, as we 
discussed above, insurers obligated on health-care-insurance 
reveivables are not subject to the usual rules applicable to account 
debtors on other accounts.l7° Other definitions facilitate provisions for 
various methods of perfection. A security interest in electronic chattel 
paper, for example, may be perfected by filing or control, whereas 
perfection with respect to tangible chattel paper requires either filing 
or possession. 171 Security interests arising out of the sale of a payment 
intangible or promissory note are automatically perfected upon 
attachment; this approach necessitated the inclusion in the definition 
of "account" many rights to payment that would have been general 
intangibles under the Former Article.172 Security interests in 
supporting obligations attach and are perfected automatically upon 
attachment and perfection with respect to the underlying, supported 
obligation.173 Security interests in letter-of-credit rights may be 
perfected only by control, except insofar as they constitute support 
obligations.174 The method of control for letter-of-credit rights differs 
from that for electronic chattel paper.175 
As the drafting process progressed, there was little serious 
disagreement on the need for special treatment with respect to certain 
rights to payment and, consequently, the need for the plethora of new 
and newly refined definitions. In this context, most viewed the web of 
receivables-related definitions that emerged as necessary 
complexity- the price, perhaps, of the broad scope of Revised Article 
9. Necessary as these provisions may be, they are complex 
nonetheless. 
4. Complexity in Context 
Rather than numbly bemoaning the complexity of Revised 
Article 9, we think it worth speculating on some of its underlying 
causes. Certainly the Drafting Committee did not set out to make the 
170. See R. § 9-406(i) . Persons obligated on a letter of credit also are treated specially. See 
id. § 9-409. 
171. See id. §§ 9-312(a) , 9-313(a) , 9-314(a). 
172. See id. § 9-309(3)-( 4 ); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-65, 68-70 (discussing 
the background of these provisions) . 
173. See R.§§ 9-203(f), 9-308(d). 
174. See id. §§ 9-308( d), 9-312(b )(2). 
175. Compare id. § 9-107 (control of letter-of-credit right) with id. § 9-105 (control of 
e lectronic chattel paper). For a discussion of this and other aspects of Revised Article 9's 
treatment of electronic chattel paper, see Jane Kaufman Winn , Electronic Chattel Paper Under 
R evised Article 9: Updating the Concept of Emb odied Rights fo r Electronic Commerce , 74 O -IL-
KENT L. RE V. 1055 (1999). 
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Article more complex. Nor did we. Some complexities correspond to 
the complexity of the transactions and financing patterns that Revised 
Article 9 addresses. Although Article 9 always has had to deal with 
complex transactions to some extent, we suspect that the very success 
of Article 9 has resulted in a substantial increase in the sophistication 
of secured transactions since the early years of the UCC. 
The shape of Revised Article 9 also may reflect a legal culture 
that is very different from that prevailing decades ago, when the 
original version of Article 9 was being formed. It is ironic that at a 
time when "legal" writing is (slowly, but surely) becoming more 
"plain" and "simple," the trend in commercial-law codification 
appears to favor more detail, more forks in the road, less elegance, 
and "answers" for ever more hypothetical cases. Ironically, this 
crusade for comprehensiveness and certainty may be fueled in part by 
rising expectations that result from the high quality of the UCC. 176 A 
lawyer who seeks guidance on a new issue approaches the common 
law with trepidation. Perhaps a case exactly on point already has been 
decided by the highest court in the relevant jurisdiction; if not (and, 
sometimes, even if so), all bets are off. In contrast, Article 9 has given 
clear answers to such a wide range of problems arising in secured 
transactions that users approach it with the expectation that it will 
answer whatever new question may have just arisen. They are not 
only disappointed but also surprised when the Article fails them. 
Another likely contributor to the pressure for increased certainty 
of result, and thus increased complexity of the statute, is the practice 
of requiring the debtor's attorney to issue a written opinion on 
attachment, perfection, and other secured-transactions-related issues 
as a condition to the extension of credit. Particularly in the case of 
publicly issued, secured debt, the ability of the debtor's counsel to 
issue a "clean opinion" can make the difference between a 
transaction that closes and one that does not. Accordingly, the 
Drafting Committee often was inclined to address in the revised 
Article what some pooh-poohed as "opinion-letter issues." 
Finally , the impact of reported decisions on the desire for 
certainty should not be overlooked. As was the case with the revision 
of Article 6, the fear that judges will "get it wrong" loomed large at 
the Article 9 Drafting Committee meetings. 177 Although they do not 
176. As the Seve nth Circuit observed , "The Uniform Commercial Code is an uncommonly 
well drafted statute." Merrill Lynch , Pie rce, Fenner & Smith , Inc. v. D evon Bank, 832 F.2d 1005. 
1008 (7th Cir. 1987). 
177. See Steven L. Harris, Article 6: The Process and the Product - An Introduction , 41 ALA. 
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hold a monopoly on rendering incorrect decisions under Article 9, 17~ 
bankruptcy judges posed a particular concern. Bankruptcy is the 
"acid test" of the durability of a security interest; a security interest 
that is unenforceable on the day of reckoning will have failed in one 
of its essential purposes. It is unsurprising that much -probably 
most- Article-9-related litigation takes place in the bankruptcy 
courts. What is surprising, however, is that this litigation gives rise to 
a large number of published judicial opinions. In fairness to the 
bankruptcy courts, we sense that often they have not had much help 
from counsel on either side of cases resulting in bad decisions. And in 
fairness to the courts and counsel, we further suspect that in many of 
these cases the stakes simply were not sufficient to warrant thorough 
analysis and briefing. Bankruptcy courts have no choice whether to 
decide cases implicating Article 9; however, they need not make the 
opinions part of the permanent jurisprudence. 
B. Dichotomies, Fuzzy Lines, Rough Justice, and Punting to the 
Courts 
It would be a mistake to conclude from the foregoing that 
Revised Article 9 has adopted a complex and detailed approach to 
every aspect of secured transactions. In some areas, the revised 
Article eschews complex rules that attempt to dictate the results 
under myriad factual settings and instead provides a clear, unadorned 
path for reaching a desired result (e.g., perfection of a security 
interest). Parties who stray from the path do so at their peril. 
Consider, for example, the revised Article's treatment of 
perfection of security interests in collateral that is in the possession of 
a person other than the debtor or the secured party. Under Former 
section 9-305, perfection could be achieved by the bailee's receipt of 
"notification of the secured party's interest." Under Revised section 
9-313, however, perfection occurs when "the person in possession 
authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds possession of the 
L. R EV. 549.580 (1990). 
178. See, e.g .. Octagon Gas Sys .. Inc . v. Rimme r. 995 F.2d 948 (lOth Cir. 1993 ). In Ocragon 
Gas. the court "erroneousl y sta ted that ·[t]he impac t of applying Article 9 to [the buyer's] 
accou nt is th at Art icle (rs treatment of accounts sold as co llateral would place [the buyer 's] 
acco unt within the property o f [the se ller' s] bankruptcy estate.'" PEE COiVIMENTARY No. 14. 
TRANS FER OF A CCO UNTS OR C HATTEL PAPER ( 1994) (quo tin g Octagon Gas. 995 F.2d a t 955). 
Revise d secti on 9-318 rejec ts Ocragon Gas inso fa r as the op inio n interpreted Art icle 9. See also 
H arris. supra note 118 (discussing two Second Circuit o pinions that retlect mi sundersta nding of 
a fundamental principle unde rlyin g Article 9). 
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collateral for the secured party's benefit." 179 The path to perfection is 
clearly marked and concisely articulated, i.e., obtain a signed writing 
or other authenticated record that recites the acknowledgement 
specified in the statute. Short of that, the contents of other 
authenticated records that might satisfy the statutory requirement are 
left to our imagination (and that of the courts). A secured party that 
chooses to rely on an acknowledgement that strays from the precise 
statutory formulation acts at its own risk. 
Of the many examples of rules and concepts in Revised Article 9 
which are painted with a broad brush, leaving the details to be 
developed by the courts, three will suffice for present purposes. 
Revised Article 9 continues the dichotomy between security interests 
arising out of sales and those in which the security interest secures an 
obligation. Although each type of security interest is treated the same 
for most purposes, some differences exist. For example, a security 
interest arising out of a sale of a payment intangible is automatically 
perfected, whereas filing is necessary to perfect a security interest in a 
payment intangible which secures an obligation. 1" 0 As with all such 
dichotomies, some transactions lie close to the borderline, and parties 
who engage in these transactions would be prudent to take the 
precaution of making alternative assumptions. Revised Article 9 also 
retains the vague but hard-to-improve-upon "commercially 
reasonable" standard as the lynchpin of a secured party's remedies on 
default. 1s1 
Revised Article 9 likewise reflects considerable restraint in 
dealing with the enforcement of subordinate security interests. The 
goal of the revised Article in this context is to encourage parties 
holding conflicting security interests to find out about one another 
and act cooperatively before a disposition occurs. To achieve this 
goal, Revised Article 9 needs very few provisions, the most significant 
of which requires an enforcing secured party to give notice of an 
intended disposition to other secured parties (including senior 
secured parties) that have filed against the debtor with respect to the 
collateral involved. 1s2 Many questions that were open under Article 9 
remain open under the revised Article. 1s:; 
179. R. ~ 9-31 3( c) (1 ): see also supru text accompanying notes 40-41. 
180. See R. 9§ 9-309(3). 9-310. 
18 1. See, e.g.. irl. § 9-610(b) (disposition o f coll a teral foll owing default must be commercially 
rea son able). 
182. See id. * 9-611. 
183. The revised Article does answer some questi ons on thi s subject. however. See, e.g .. id. 
1400 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1357 
On the other hand, in some areas experience may demonstrate 
that the approach of Revised Article 9 is too timid. Particularly 
lamentable in this respect is the treatment- or the lack thereof- of 
certain aspects of consumer transactions. For example, for 
nonconsumer transactions Revised section 9-626 adopts the 
"rebuttable presumption" rule for a secured party's noncompliance 
with the Article. Until late in the drafting process, drafts of the 
revised Article included an alternative "absolute bar" rule, thereby 
inviting each enacting state to choose the approach that it deemed 
most appropriate for consumer transactions. That approach would 
have cleared up a good deal of confusion and uncertainty under the 
Former Article. Unfortunately, as a part of a compromise, the 
rebuttable presumption rule codified in Revised section 9-626(a) 
explicitly applies only to transactions other than consumer 
transactions. Revised section 9-626(b) represents a damage-control 
effort; it provides: 
(b) [Non-consumer transactions; no inference.] The limitation of 
the rules in subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer ,,,. 
transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of 
the proper rules in consumer transactions. The court may not infer 
from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer 
transactions and may continue to apply established approaches. 
Whether subsection (b) will yield in practice its apparently 
intended consequences remains to be seen. We fear that it will induce 
counsel to litigate anew the proper rule in consumer transactions, 
even when the applicable rule was settled under the applicable 
jurisdiction's Former Article 9. 
CONCLUSION 
Revised Article 9 emerged from the lengthiest and most publicly 
vetted uniform law project to date. Preparatory work for the Study 
Committee began in the fall of 1989. Now, in June 1999, we continue 
to stumble across stylistic and other minor errors as well as a few that 
are more substantive. No one can expect such a large and complex 
statutory treatment to be "perfect" and free of error. This is 
especially so when one considers that the heavy lifting on the project 
was undertaken by volunteer labor. 184 It is to this volunteer labor that 
the project owes its success. The Drafting Committee was dedicated 
§ 9-615(g) (junior secured party 's right to retain cash proceeds of disposition). 
184. As reporters, we did receive a modest stipend, however. 
'1 
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and hard working. Its chair, William M. Burke, guided the Drafting 
Committee firmly, but gently, through hundreds of hours of 
deliberations on difficult and sometimes controversial issues. Credit 
also goes to the hundreds of persons who contributed in other ways-
as formal advisors to the Drafting Committee, as members of the 
ALI's Members Consultative Group, as Uniform Law 
Commissioners, through bar committees, through interest groups, 
through trade associations, and as individuals concerned about 
improving commercial law. 
Looking back on the drafting process, we are reminded 
constantly that Revised Article 9 was not written upon a blank slate. 
The revised Article is a direct outgrowth of its predecessor, a statute 
thought by many to be the "crown jewel" of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. Upon completion of the PEB Study Committee Report, we 
were surprised to have discovered so many flaws and shortcomings in 
Former Article 9. More than six years later, however, having 
completed the drafting of a wholesale revision of the Former Article, 
we are humbled by the process and the challenge. It is now even 
clearer to us how outstanding was the work of the original drafters 
and those who drafted the 1972 revisions. We owe a great debt to 
those drafters, including, among others, Grant Gilmore, Robert 
Braucher, Peter Coogan, Robert Haydock, and Homer Kripke. We 
cannot reflect on our involvement with the revision of Article 9 
without also reflecting on theirs. And, in looking forward to July 1, 
2001, and beyond, we dare to hope that the statute to which we have 
dedicated such a substantial part of our professional lives will live up 
to the high standards they set. 
